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I met a traveller from an antique land 
Who said: "Two vast and trunkless legs of stone 
Stand in the desert, ... Near them on the sand, 
Half sunk, a shattered visage lies, whose frown 
And wrinkled lip and sneer of cold command 
Tell that its sculptor well those passions read 
Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things, 
The hand that mocked them and the heart that fed. 
And on the pedestal these words appear: 
'My name is Ozymandias, king of kings: 
Look on my works, ye mighty, and despair.' 
Nothing beside remains. Round the decay 
Of that colossal wreck, boundless and bare, 
The lone and level sands stretch far away." 
Percy Bysshe Shelley, Ozymandias, 18171 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Secretary of the Interior traditionally has had immense power 
over the allocation of America's public natural resources. That power 
evolved because many of the statutes governing the Department of 
the Interior were phrased in discretionary instead of mandatory 
terms, and because decisions of the Interior Secretaries, although 
I In, e.g., 3 THE COMPLETE POETICAL WORKS OF PERCY BYSSHE SHELLEY 25 (W. Rossetti 
ed. 1878). 
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they have always been monitored closely by those who stood to gain 
or lose directly by them, were seldom very visible to the general 
public. In recent years, secretarial discretion has been limited by a 
spate of more precise statutes,2 by the swirling political crosscur-
rents that now engulf the office,3 and by a commitment to the status 
quo shared by many beneficiaries of existing arrangements. 4 
Secretaries of the Interior only rarely achieve general notoriety. 
In the 1920s, the Teapot Dome scandal and the bribery conviction 
of Secretary Albert B. Fall generated considerable publicity and is 
said to have retarded mineral leasing for decades. 5 In the 1930s, 
Secretary Harold Ickes was a well-known and controversial New 
Deal leader. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, however, the Depart-
ment gave the appearance of a moribund haven for private privilege. 
The start of a new era in public land policy can be traced to the 
tenure of Secretary Stewart Udall in the' 1960s. Not only did the 
Kennedy and Johnson Administrations prevail upon Congress to pass 
a precedent-breaking series of preservation-oriented laws,6 but In-
terior Solicitor Frank Barry also succeeded in reversing long-stand-
ing Department policies. 7 Secretaries during the Nixon-Ford years 
2 See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text. 
3 Resource decisionmaking in the Interior Department and ensuing litigation is now almost 
always polycentric. Public land users inevitably argue that any proposed course of action is 
too restrictive while environmentalists claim that it is too lenient. Resource scientists within 
and without the agency often feel that the proposal is too economically oriented, while the 
resource economists refuse to recognize any other basis for decision. States complain of a lack 
of consultation and deference to their desires, while federal political superiors dictate legally 
unacceptable results. Public land management is now conducted in a fishbowl-type atmosphere, 
and the lot of a land manager is not always a happy one. See generally P. CULHANE, PUBLIC 
LANDS POLITICS (1981); S. DANA & S. FAIRFAX, FOREST AND RANGE POLICY (1980); Fairfax, 
Old Recipes For New Federalism, 12 ENVTL. L. 945, 969-73 (1982). 
4 See Leshy, Sharing Federal Multiple-Use Lands-Historic Lessons and Speculations for 
the Future, in RETHINKING THE FEDERAL LANDS 235, 254-71 (S. Brubaker ed. 1984). 
5 See C. MAYER & G. RILEY, PUBLIC DOMAIN, PRIVATE DOMINION: A HISTORY OF PUBLIC 
MINERAL POLICY IN AMERICA 196-97 (1985); B. NOGGLE, TEAPOT DOME: OIL AND POLITICS 
IN THE 1920's, at 209-10 (1962). 
6 These included: The Wilderness Act, Pub. L. No. 88-577, 78 Stat. 890, 890-96 (codified as 
amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988)) (enacted 1964); the Land and Water Conservation 
Fund Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 88-578, 78 Stat. 897, 897-904 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 460d, 4601-4 to 4601-11 (1988)) (enacted 1964); the Classification and Multiple Use Act, Pub. 
L. No. 88-607, 78 Stat. 986, 986-88 (previously codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (1970)) 
(enacted 1964, expired 1970); the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act, Pub. L. No. 90-452, 88 Stat. 
906, 906-18 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988)) (enacted 1968); and the 
National Trails System Act, Pub. L. No. 90-543, 82 Stat. 919, 919-26 (codified as amended at 
16 U.S.C. §§ 1241-1251 (1988)) (enacted 1968). 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 599, 602-04 (1968) (redefining "valuable 
mineral deposit"); United States v. Tulare Lake Canal Co., 535 F.2d 1093, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 
1976) (enforcing Reclamation Act restrictions), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977). 
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were conservatives grappling with a slew of new environmental 
mandates.8 Secretary Hickel stood out in that transition period both 
for his advocacy of change and for his dismissal as a result. 9 Secretary 
Andrus' tenure under President Carter solidified the conservation 
gains of preceding administrations. By use of statutory withdrawal 
powerslO and new allocation policies more in line with the new sta-
tutory structure,l1 Secretary Andrus moved resource protection 
closer to the top of Interior's priority list. 
James Gaius Watt succeeded Andrus in early 1981. Mr. Watt's 
secretaryship exhibited substantive and stylistic tendencies that dif-
fered markedly from all other Interior Secretaries of this century. 
His philosophy of public land policy differed so radically from the 
assumptions underlying most of the reforms in public land and nat-
ural resources law for the quarter century preceding his appointment 
that his tenure offers a fascinating study of modern federal policy 
dynamics. In short, Mr. Watt evinced a reactionary desire to return 
to an earlier age, an age that likely existed only in nostalgic imagi-
nation. The irrepressible Secretary tried to swing back the pendulum 
of public land law and policy.12 He won several skirmishes, but he 
8 These mandates were manifested in the pollution and wildlife laws of the early 1970s, such 
as the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852, 852-56 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4375 (1982 & Supp. v 1987» (enacted 1970); the 
Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-378, 88 
Stat. 476, 476-80 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1687 (1988)); and the public land 
statutes cited supra note 6. On the unsuccessful efforts of one Interior division, the Bureau 
of Land Management (BLM), to adjust to the new mandates, see Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Hughes, 435 F. Supp. 981, 984-85, 992 (D.D.C. 1977) (coal leasing program 
EIS held inadequate), modified, 454 F. Supp. 1286, 1288, 1297-98 (D.D.C. 1978) (off-road 
vehicle regulations held inadequate); and Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 388 
F. Supp. 829, 831-32, 840-41 (D. D.C. 1974) (grazing program EIS held inadequate), aff'd, 
527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976). 
9 See P. WILEY & R. GOTTLIEB, EMPIRES IN THE SUN: THE RISE OF THE NEW AMERICAN 
WEST 47-49 (1982). 
10 "Withdrawals" remove tracts of land from availability for specified uses. See infra note 
216 and accompanying text. In 1978, Secretary Andrus and President Carter cited the Antiq-
uities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. §§ 431-433 (1988), and the emergency withdrawal section of the 
Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982), as authority 
for a part of their withdrawals of over 100 million acres of land in Alaska. See Alaska v. 
Carter, 462 F. Supp. 1155, 1158-59, 1161 (D. Alaska 1978). 
1l See, e.g., County of Del Norte v. United States, 732 F.2d 1462, 1464-65 (9th Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied sub nom. Association of Calif. Water Agencies v. United States, 469 U.S. 1189 
(1985); American Motorcyclists Ass'n v. Watt, 534 F. Supp. 923, 928-29 (C.D. Cal. 1981), 
aff'd, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983). 
12 Secretary Watt vowed to make drastic changes in the way Interior manages its lands by 
"swing[ing] the pendulum back to center." Adler, James Watt's Land Rush, NEWSWEEK, 
June 29, 1981, at 22. Another of his favorite themes was managing federal resources in order 
to "allow the marketplace to work." See, e.g., Mosher, Reagan and the GOP Are Riding the 
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failed to achieve any notable substantive success, and his major 
programs for change came to naught. This Article assesses Mr. 
Watt's resource allocation initiatives against the backdrop of public 
land law evolution. 
Section II of this Article explains pertinent historical, philosoph-
ical, administrative, and personal background. It introduces the De-
partment of the Interior and Mr. Watt, briefly describes the evolu-
tion and organization of the Department, the mixed legal mandates 
implemented by it, and the areas in which secretarial discretion is 
prominent. Section II also recounts Mr. Watt's background and ex-
pressed policy preferences as he assumed office in 1981. 
The remaining sections discuss a dozen or so land and resource 
initiatives of the Watt years. This Article categorizes these initia-
tives according to the three overlapping main themes of Mr. Watt's 
abortive revolution: (1) federal ownership of land, if not unconsti-
tutional or unconscionable, is at least A Bad Idea; (2) to the extent 
that land remains in federal ownership, valuable land should be 
reclassified or transferred to make them more easily accessible to 
resource developers; and (3) the resources of the federal lands should 
be made available to private developers to the maximum possible 
extent, at minimum cost, and with the fewest possible regulatory 
restrictions. 
The fate of those new management emphases on disposal, devel-
opment, and deregulation is the subject of this Article. Section III 
recounts the attempts of the Watt Administration to privatize the 
public lands. These attempts included proposed sales of "surplus" 
BLM lands, a moratorium on acquisition of national lands for rec-
reation, and proposed land exchanges. Section IV then examines the 
closely related subject of federal land classification during the Watt 
years. The Interior Department tried to shift public land jurisdiction 
to agencies favoring more development and to reclassify lands into 
less restrictive categories, but it met with little success. Section V 
addresses some of the more notorious attempts to privatize public 
natural resources. Under this heading were Mr. Watt's pushes to 
increase coal, oil, gas, and other types of mineral leasing on the 
federal lands, both onshore and offshore, and his attempt to abdicate 
federal control over livestock grazing. 
Sagebrush Rebellion-But for How Long?, 13 NAT'L J. 476, 479 (1981). The unlikelihood of 
his success was predicted by several contemporary commentators. See, e.g., Coggins, The 
Public Interest in Public Land Law: A Commentary on the Policies of Secretary Watt, 4 
PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 26-27 (1983); Sax, Why We Will Not (Should Not) Sell the Public 
Lands: Changing Conceptions of Private Property, 1983 UTAH L. REV. 313, 325-26. 
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The final section of this Article assesses the legacy of Secretary 
Watt, and draws several conclusions from the failure of the Watt 
policies. Although the Watt years were unambiguously aberrant, the 
attempts to reverse the course of history in this area offer valuable 
lessons for the future. 
Two related disclaimers are in order. First, this Article makes no 
pretense of exhaustiveness. The examples of changes introduced by 
Secretary Watt were chosen for inclusion because of their importance 
and visibility. Second, Mr. Watt and his policies were not unmiti-
gatedly evil or bad, even from a solely preservationist viewpoint. 
Evidently, he was sincere in advocating his new policies. He insti-
tuted and implemented several changes that benefit the general 
conservation cause,13 and some of his ideas that could streamline 
public land administration retain vitality.14 Still, the Watt dream 
quickly turned to ashes, and, of his great reform program, "nothing 
beside remains." 
II. THE DEPARTMENT AND MR. WATT: AN INTRODUCTION 
"Buy the shores of Gitche Gurnee, 
Buy the shining offshore leases, 
Buy the shining mining leases, 
Giving me the credit due me, 
And you'll be as rich as Croesus, 
Richer far than old King Croesus, 
Though the Congress may be shrew me, 
Pick my policies to pieces, 
Reagan's will is working through me, 
Not to mention Edwin Meese's." 
Thus spake Watt in his ascendence, 
Pillar of Conservatism, 
Glowing with a great resplendence, 
Til he brewed a mess of pottage, 
That created massive schism, 
Dimmed his incandescent wattage, 
13 The most noteworthy of these contributions were Secretary Watt's support of the Coastal 
Barrier Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3510 (1988) (enacted 1982) and his efforts to repair 
and upgrade national park facilities. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, NATIONAL PARKS' 
HEALTH AND SAFETY PROBLEMS GIVEN PRIORITY; COST ESTIMATES AND SAFETY MANAGE-
MENT COULD BE IMPROVED 6-13 (1983) (discussing the effort by the National Park Service 
to improve facilities in national parks). 
14 See infra notes 203-06, 309-11 and accompanying text. 
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Even in the Great White Cottage, 
Spreading through the Great White Cottage, 
Instant Oval Roomatism. 
Thereupon Watt drew dismissal, 
Drew dismissal unexpected 
When the Wise Men blew the whistle: 
Reagan must be re-elected. 
479 
Felicia Lamport, The Song of High Watt (1983)15 
The Department of the Interior (the Department) is a curious 
institution. Its responsibilities are highly varied, its mandates are 
fragmented, and the statutes it implements cover a wide subject 
matter spectrum. Efforts to reorganize the Department often have 
been thwarted by entrenched political and economic interests. 16 Sub-
stantive reforms of departmental missions and procedures have been 
few and far between. 17 Resource allocation by the Department has 
been rife with endemic and epidemic conflict. The Secretary tradi-
tionally has had wide discretion to allocate resources, but that dis-
cretion has been narrowed by recent statutes. 
A. The Department of the Interior 
1. History 
The Department of the Interior was created in 1848; its primary 
constituent was the General Land Office, which had been in the 
business of selling public land since 1812. The Supreme Court long 
has characterized the Department as the trustee of America's public 
land assets. 1S The Department's history, however, often has featured 
lax administration of public land laws, interjurisdictional squabbles, 
15 Lamport, The Song of High Watt, N. Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1983, § 4, at 19, cols. 5-6 (copyright 
Felicia Lamport; used by permission). 
16 See Leshy, supra note 4, at 251. 
17 In the realm of grazing regulation, for instance, Congress waited more than 40 years to 
reform the law in the face of evidence that public land grazing continued to destroy the 
productive capacity of the land. See Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, The Law of Public Range-
land Management II: The Commons and the Taylor Act, 13 ENVTL. L. 1, 87-91 (1982); see 
also infra notes 466-77 and accompanying text. Similarly, the public land mining location 
statutes, indefensible on any modern policy basis, remain essentially unchanged from a century 
ago. See generally J. LESHY, THE MINING LAW-A STUDY IN PERPETUAL MOTION 89-118, 
158-67 (1987). 
18 See, e.g., Knight v. United States Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 178, 181 (1891). 
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lack of coordination, increasing agency specialization, and informal 
alliances with resource developers. 19 
Until the 1890s, the main job of the Interior Department was to 
expedite the transfer of public land to state and private ownership. 
States received hundreds of millions of acres through statehood acts, 
the swampland laws, the Morrill Act, and special disposition stat-
utes. 20 The Department today administers the program whereby the 
State of Alaska will select over 100 million acres of federal lands,21 
and it deals with remaining "in lieu" state selection problems from 
earlier eras. 22 
The Interior Department also was responsible for overseeing the 
large grants to the transcontinental railroads23 and small grants to 
individual homesteaders24 by which the West was settled. Imple-
mentation of both programs was marked by fraud, corruption, lax-
ness, and perjury, but a degree of lawlessness generally was toler-
ated in the era following the Civil War. 25 The massive 
transcontinental railroad grants ended in 1871,26 and homesteading 
ceased for all practical purposes in 1934.27 
It is difficult to pinpoint the beginnings of the Department as a 
conservation agency, but the origins of the various agencies within 
the Department are indicative of the shift from land agent to re-
source manager and protector. 28 Although Congress established Yel-
19 For a discussion of the history of the Department of the Interior, see G. COGGINS & C. 
WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW ch. 2 (2d ed. 1987); P. GATES, 
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968). 
20 See P. GATES, supra note 19, chs. XII-XIII. 
21 See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 165-68, 249-57. 
22 State "in lieu" claims arose when lands granted to states by their statehood acts were 
already legally taken by other acts or reserved for federal purposes. See, e.g., Andrus v. 
Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 501-02 (1980). 
23 See Act of July 1, 1862, 12 Stat. 489; G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 
88-105. 
24 E.g., Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, 392-94 (previously codified at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 161-302 1970)) (enacted 1862, repealed 1976); Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (1982)) (enacted 1877); Kincaid Act, ch. 1801, 
33 Stat. 547, 547-48 (previously codified at 43 U.S.C. § 224 (1976)) (enacted 1904, repealed 
1976); Enlarged Homestead Act, ch. 160,35 Stat. 639, 639-40 (previously codified at 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 218-221 (1976)) (enacted 1909, repealed 1976); Stock Raising Homestead Act, ch. 9, 39 
Stat. 862, 862-65 (previously codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302 (1976)) (enacted 1916, repealed 
1976); see G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 65-82. In total, the United States 
gave away or sold over one billion acres. 
25 See, e.g., P. GATES, supra note 19, at 395-434. 
26 The differences between the early and later railroad grants is explained in Great Northern 
Railway v. United States, 315 U.S. 262, 270-80 (1941). 
27 See generally E. PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 5, 214-24 (1951). 
28 For a discussion of the shift in policies and priorities, see P. GATES, supra note 19; R. 
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lows tone National Park in 1872, the Department was powerless to 
manage the area as a park until much later,29 and the National Park 
Service (NPS or Park Service), now the most visible agency in the 
Department, did not see birth until 1916.30 Similarly, while wildlife 
refuges were reserved as early as 1903, the Department did not have 
an agency (now the Fish and Wildlife Service) devoted to their 
management as refuges until 1940.31 In 1902, the Reclamation Act 
created the Bureau of Reclamation (BuRec), which has since con-
structed an immense system of dams and diversions for irrigation in 
the West. 32 
The Interior Department still retains most of its historic functions. 
The Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the unhappy product of a 
1946 merger of the Grazing Service and the General Land Office, 
administers the few remaining programs whereby individuals, cor-
porations, and political entities can gain title to federal land. 33 The 
BLM also oversees mineral locations under the General Mining Law 
of 1872,34 leases various minerals under various laws,35 and issues 
permits for livestock grazing on the public lands,36 among other 
tasks. 37 In addition to housing the NPS, the FWS, the BLM, BuRec, 
and other agencies,38 the Department has its own legaP9 and 
NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (3d ed. 1982); J. SAX, MOUNTAIN WITHOUT 
HANDRAILS (1980); Coggins, supra note 12. 
29 See W. EVERHARDT, THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE 9-21 (172). 
30 National Park Service Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). 
31 See M. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 119--34 (2d ed. 1983); 
Coggins & Ward, The Law of Wildlife Management on the Federal Public Lands, 60 OR. L. 
REV. 59, 94 (1981). For a general discussion of the Fish and Wildlife Service, see N. REED & 
D. DRABELLE, THE UNITED STATES FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE (1984). 
:32 See Kelley, Staging a Comeback-Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, 18 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 97 (1984); Taylor, California Water Project: Law and Politics, 5 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1975). 
33 See Faulkner v. Watt, 661 F.2d 809, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1981); Bleamaster v. Morton, 448 
F.2d 1289 (9th Cir. 1971). 
34 See 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-28 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). For a general discussion of the BLM's 
duties, see J. LESHY, supra note 17; Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands, 1974 UTAH 
L. REV. 185. 
35 See generally ROCKY MOUNTAIN MINERAL LAW FOUNDATION, THE LAW OF FEDERAL 
OIL AND GAS LEASES (1987). 
36 For a general discussion of public rangeland management, see Coggins & Lindeberg-
Johnson, supra note 17. See also infra notes 461-70 and accompanying text. 
37 On the BLM generally, see E. BAYNARD, PUBLIC LAND LAW AND PROCEDURE (1986); 
M. CLAWSON, THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT 8-19 (1971). 
38 The Department also contains the U.S. Geological Survey, the Minerals Management 
Service, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, but those agencies and their operations are beyond 
the scope of this Article. 
39 The Interior Department Solicitor, as general counsel to the Secretary, heavily influences 
public land law through written opinions on statutory construction and like issues. See Rocky 
Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 741, 744 (lOth Cir. 1982). 
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adjudicative40 arms, and was given the task of surface mining reg-
ulation in 1977.41 
2. The Mixed Mandate 
The bureaus and services that comprise the Interior Department 
are not independent agencies; each is one part of a strictly hierar-
chical structure with the Secretary at the top of the pyramid. These 
line bureaus operate only on delegated authority because the stat-
utes they implement usually grant final powers of decision to the 
Secretary. 
The National Park Service empire has steadily grown; it now 
encompasses monuments, recreation areas, rivers, battlefields, gate-
way and urban parks, and a variety of other special areas, in addition 
to the "flagship" national parks.42 The basic Park Service mandate 
is limited to preservation and recreation43-sometimes internally 
inconsistent management objectives-and many units within the 
park system are governed by specific management statutes. 44 Re-
source conflicts in national parks are litigated relatively rarely. One 
prominent dispute concerned the allocation of rafting privileges on 
the Colorado River through Grand Canyon National Park; the courts 
upheld the quota system devised by the NPS.45 
The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), a relative newcomer,46 both 
manages the eighty-odd million acres set aside for wildlife protection 
40 The Interior Office of Hearing and Appeals contains the Interior Board of Land Appeals 
which, as the Secretary's delegate, decides contested cases from the BLM. See infra note 
253. 
41 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 121l(c) (1982); see also 
infra note 321. 
42 See W. EVERHARDT, supra note 29, at 52-60. The NPS now manages 68.5 million acres, 
the bulk of which is in Alaska. 
4a See National Park Service Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). For a general discussion of American 
land conservation, see S. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS (1963). 
44 See 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-450rr-6 (1988). 
45 Wilderness Public Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d 1250, 1253-54 (9th Cir. 1979), cen. 
denied, 446 U.S. 982 (1980). 
46 The FWS has had a somewhat checkered history. In 1939, the Bureau of Biological Survey 
within the Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Fisheries within the Department of 
Commerce, were both transferred to Interior, and the two agencies were consolidated into 
the Fish and Wildlife Service a year later. The two bureaus were again separated in 1956, 
when the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife was created within the Department of 
Interior, and the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, with responsibilities over marine fisheries, 
was transferred back to Commerce, where it became the National Marine Fisheries Service. 
The Bureau of Sport Fisheries was renamed the Fish and Wildlife Service in 1974. See M. 
BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 65-66 (1983). The agency responsibil-
ities remain divided. For a discussion of the history of American Wildlife Management, see 
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and administers several general regulatory programs intended to 
benefit wildlife, especially migratory birds,47 marine mammals,48 and 
endangered or threatened species. 49 Congress directed the Fish and 
Wildlife Service to manage its lands primarily for protection and 
propagation of wildlife, and, secondarily, for all other natural re-
source uses. 50 Several recent judicial opinions have confirmed the 
precedence of wildlife in refuge management,51 even though hunting 
is allowed on parts of many refuges. 52 Congress in 1964 commanded 
both the NPS and the FWS to commence wilderness designation 
processes for lands under their care. 53 Compared with the Forest 
Service experience with wilderness studies, such designation has 
been relatively uncontroversial. 54 
The BLM, which is in charge of more land than the other Interior 
agencies combined, is at once the key player and the weakest link 
in the Department. Its main historical functions are indicated by its 
derisory nickname, the "Bureau of Livestock and Mining." The 
agency has long been considered a model of the "capture" phenom-
enon because some of its operations essentially have been controlled 
by the entities that the agency is supposed to regulate. 55 Its attempts 
to avoid conflict by pacifying public land users increasingly have 
fallen afoul of the law. 56 In 1976, Congress decreed that the BLM 
henceforth would promulgate land use plans and manage for mUltiple 
H. BORLAND, THE HISTORY OF WILDLIFE IN AMERICA (1975) and Greenwalt, The National 
Wildlife Refuge System, in WILDLIFE AND AMERICA 399 (H. Brokaw ed. 1978). 
47 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-711 (1988). 
48 Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1384 (1988). 
49 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). 
50 Refuge Recreation Act of 1962, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460k to 460k-4 (1988); National Wildlife 
Refuge System Administration Act of 1966, 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (1988). 
51 Schwenke v. Secretary of the Interior, 720 F.2d 571, 577-78 (9th Cir. 1983); Defenders 
of Wildlife v. Andrus, 11 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2098, 2101 (D.D.C. 1978); see also M. BEAN, 
supra note 31, at 125-34; N. REED & D. DRABELLE, supra note 31. 
52 See N. REED & D. DRABELLE, supra note 31, ch. 4. 
5:1 Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988). 
54 See J. HENDEE, G. STANKEY & R. LUCAS, WILDERNESS MANAGEMENT 106-23 (1978). 
55 See, e.g., W. CALEF, PRIVATE GRAZING AND PUBLIC LANDS (1960); P. Foss, POLITICS 
AND GRASS (1960); W. VOIGT, THE PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS (1976); Coggins & Lindeberg-
Johnson, supra note 17, at 61-68; Shanks, Sagebrush Rebellion, 56 DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE 
38, 39 (Apr. 1981); Trueblood, They're Fixing to Steal Your Land, 84 FIELD & STREAM 40, 
167 (Mar. 1980). 
56 See, e.g., American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 543 F. Supp. 789, 795-97 (C.D. Cal. 
1982); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981, 988-91 (D.D.C. 
1977); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Morton, 393 F. Supp. 1286, 1291-92 (D.D.C. 1975); Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 833-34 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd 
per curiam, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976); see also infra notes 
246-75 and accompanying text. 
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use and sustained yield. 57 The agency's efforts to adopt a more 
balanced management regime have been criticized almost univer-
ally. 58 
The Bureau of Reclamation is the closest approximation of a pure 
"development" agency in the Department. Its main task is construc-
tion and operation of the dams and diversions that since 1902 have 
transformed many arid areas of the West with heavily subsidized 
irrigation water. 59 The Department's Office of Surface Mining Recla-
mation and Enforcement, on the other hand, regulates private min-
ing operations and lacks land management responsibilities. 60 Those 
two agencies will not figure much in this narrative. 
One other agency, although not within the Department of the 
Interior, deserves mention. The Department of Agriculture houses 
the Forest Service, which has managed the 190 million acres of 
reserved forest lands since 1905. 61 The Forest Service has encoun-
tered the same conflicts between preservation and development that 
bedevil Interior. It too has been forced to reassess its practices in 
light of new statutory emphases on preservation and multiple use. 62 
57 43 U.S.C. §§ 1712, 1732(a) (1982 & Supp. v 1987); see also Coggins, The Law of Public 
Rangeland Management IV: FLPMA, PRIA, and the Multiple Use Mandate, 14 ENVTL. L. 
1 (1983). 
58 Numerous newspaper and magazine articles chronicled the parade of horribles as the 
BLM haltingly shifted into its new mode of operation. See, e.g., Bavarskis, The BLM's Big 
Dilemma: Tussle Over Federal Lands, PLANNING, June 1977, at 10; Church, Rural Counties 
Angry Over New BLM Rules, Nev. St. J., Jan. 11, 1976, at 1, col. 1; Mathews, The Angry 
West vs. the Rest, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 17, 1981, at 31; Shabecoff, Easing Federal Control of 
Public Land, N. Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1981, at A21, col. 1; Shanks, supra note 55, at 39. 
59 The Bureau of Reclamation was created by the Reclamation Act, which directed the 
Secretary of the Interior to "locate and construct ... irrigation works" in the 17 Western 
states. 43 U.S.C. § 411 (1982). The intent of the Act was to provide incentives for farmers to 
settle the West by providing water for irrigation. The Act originally provided that project 
construction costs would be repaid over a period of 10 years without interest. See B. HOLMES, 
A HISTORY OF FEDERAL WATER RESOURCES PROGRAMS, 1800-1960, at 7 (1983). The Act 
limited the amount of land that anyone individual could irrigate to 160 acres, 43 U.S.C. § 431 
(1982), in order to benefit the small homesteader, but abuses were rampant. The Bureau 
embarked Interior on a massive construction program that encompassed several hundred 
projects by 1983. BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, SUMMARY 
STATISTICS, VOLUME I, at 1 (1983). Despite some attempts to curb abuses, the program still 
provides massive subsidies to Western irrigators. See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FED'N, SHORT-
CHANGING THE TREASURY: THE FAILURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR TO COMPLY 
WITH THE INSPECTOR GENERAL'S AUDIT RECOMMENDATIONS TO RECOVER THE COSTS OF 
FEDERAL WATER PROJECTS 1 (1984). The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982,43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa 
to 390zz-1 (1982 & Supp. v 1987), liberalized some former limits. 
60 See infra note 321. 
61 See Huffman, A History of Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENVTL. L. 239, 267-80 
(1978). 
62 For a discussion of the Forest Service's various and often conflicting missions, see Wilk-
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All land management agencies, as representatives of the govern-
mental owner, have narrow, ill-defined powers to outlaw or regulate 
private activities on adjacent lands that pose dangers to federal 
resources and amenities. 63 Only the FWS (with respect to wildlife)64 
and the Office of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement (with 
respect to stripmining), 65 however, have general regulatory powers 
over all private entities. 
In sum, the present departmental organization, as a product more 
of history than of logic, is not always internally consistent. 66 The 
Department of the Interior is a mixed bag of agencies, each subject 
to mixed mandates. The Department's mission includes elements of 
preservation, recreational use, resource exploitation, resource pro-
tection, dam building, and regulation of private activities. The agen-
cies within the Department by law serve radically different pur-
poses, often imposing on the Secretary the burden of reconciliation. 
Each land management agency's legal mandate also contains the 
seeds of intra-agency and intra-resource allocation conflict. Alloca-
tional conflicts are inevitable because they are built into the statu-
tory, political, and administrative contexts. Consequently, the Sec-
retary of the Interior must mediate constantly among the contending 
mandates, resources, and parties. 
3. Secretarial Discretion 
Most of the statutes applicable to the Interior Department dele-
gate powers directly to the Secretary,67 who then subdelegates pow-
ers to undersecretaries and agencies. The Secretary retains the final 
power of decision, but he seldom exercises it in individual adjudi-
cations. 68 Congressional attitudes about the appropriate degree of 
inson & Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1 
(1985). 
63 See Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 524-26 (1897); Minnesota v. Block, 660 F.2d 
1240, 1249-51 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1007 (1982); G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, 
supra note 19, at 202-09. 
64 The statutes cited supra notes 47-49 authorize general regulatory programs. See N. 
REED & D. DRABELLE, supra note 31. 
65 Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & 
Supp. v 1987); see also infra note 321. 
66 Further, the Department lacks jurisdiction over some aspects of public natural re-
sources-notably the national forests and marine creatures-that logically should be included. 
Presidential efforts over many decades to combine related functions in a Department of 
Natural Resources failed. 
67 E.g., 43 U.S.C. §§ 1711(a), 1712(a) (1982). 
68 See infra note 252 and accompanying text. 
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secretarial discretion have differed radically over the years. In the 
disposition era, the Secretary frequently had little choice: if an ap-
plicant even arguably had met the statutory conditions, the law 
required the Department to transfer the land to him or her.69 Mineral 
"location" under the 1872 Mining Law is perhaps the sole remaining 
vestige of this age. 70 
In the era of conservation, Congress greatly broadened secretarial 
discretion. Although the Yellowstone71 and National Park System72 
Acts strictly limited the purposes of park management, they gave 
the Secretary considerable leeway in the means used to achieve those 
purposes. Laws of 189173 and 190674 granted the President authority 
to decide which lands merited protection as forests and monuments, 
and the 1910 Pickett Act allowed the executive branch to withdraw 
any public land for any purpose it deemed pUblic. 75 The 1920 Mineral 
Leasing Act76 made fuel mineral exploitation dependent upon an 
initial secretarial decision whether to lease or to grant prospecting 
permits, and also authorized the Secretary to attack conditions to 
leases. 77 The leasing model was followed and extended to subsequent 
energy mineral legislation. 78 The 1934 Taylor Grazing Act contained 
some guidelines for grazing permit issuance but essentially left the 
matter to the Secretary's judgment.79 Although not confirmed by a 
general statute until 1966, secretarial authority to manage wildlife 
refuges long was assumed to be without significant limitation.80 De-
partmental discretion has never been as broad as that of the Forest 
Service under its 1897 Organic Act,81 coupled with the 1960 Multiple-
69 See, e.g., Ard v. Brandon, 156 U.S. 537 (1895). 
70 The duty to issue a patent is widely recognized to be a ministerial act. See South Dakota 
v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980), and cases cited therein. 
71 Yellowstone National Park Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-40c (1988). 
72 National Park Service Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18(f) (1988). 
73 Forest Reserve Act of 1891, ch. 561, § 24, 26 Stat. 1103 (previously codified at 16 U.S.C. 
§ 471 (1970)) (repealed 1976). 
74 National Monument Act, ch. 3060, § 2, 34 Stat. 225 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 431-433 (1988)). 
75 Pickett Act, ch. 421, § 1, 36 Stat. 847 (previously codified at 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1970)) 
(enacted 1910, repealed 1976). 
76 Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 30 U.S. C.). 
77 See United States ex rei. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 417 (1931); cf. Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 557-58 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
78 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982 & Supp. v 1987); 
Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1025 (1982). 
79 43 U.S.C. §§ 315~15r (1982); see also Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 17, at 
53. 
80 See Greenwalt, supra note 46. 
81 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-482 (1988); see also Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 62, at 46-60. 
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Use, Sustained-Yield Act,82 but the statutes governing Interior op-
erations gave rise to the notion that the Secretary could do pretty 
much as he pleased with America's public resources. 
Modern legislation in this age of resource protection and preser-
vation has reverted more toward the mode of limited discretion. 
Congress had given less and less deference to the presumed profes-
sional expertise of the agencies, and many of the Secretary's re-
sponsibilities, once outlined only in general terms, are now fleshed 
out in statutory detail and are framed in mandatory language. The 
broad management statutes are now supplemented or supplanted by 
the more detailed strictures of, for example, the Federal Land Policy 
and Management Act (FLPMA),83 the National Forest Management 
Act (NFMA),84 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA).85 Other 
laws, such as the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),86 the 
Wilderness Act,87 the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act,88 and the Surface 
Mining Control and Reclamation Act,89 have thrust entirely new 
responsibilities on the Department. Many of these statutes, unlike 
earlier laws, also contain elaborate procedural provisions. 90 
Just as significantly, perhaps, courts since the 1969 Parker v. 
United States91 decision have evinced a willingness to confine sec-
retarial discretion within statutory bounds92-a very important re-
versal of earlier judicial laissez-faire attitudes. 93 Other judicial doc-
trines such as implied reserved water rights94 and the public trust95 
>12 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (l988). 
&, 43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1784 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). 
84 National Forest Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-588, 90 Stat. 2949 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S. C.). 
85 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). 
86 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
87 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (1988). 
88 16 U.S.C. §§ 1271-1287 (1988). 
89 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 1201-1328 (West 1987 & Supp. 1989). 
90 See, e.g., American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 534 F. Supp. 923, 933-86 (C.D. Cal. 1981) 
(discussing FLPMA planning provisions), aff'd, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983). 
91 309 F. Supp. 593 (D. Colo. 1970), afi'd, 448 F.2d 793 (lOth Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 
U.S. 989 (1972). 
92 The most prominent decision limiting secretarial discretion may be National Audubon 
Society v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825 (D. Alaska 1984). For a discussion of National Audubon 
Society v. Hodel, see infra notes 181-99 and accompanying text. 
93 See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, ch. 4, § B. 
94 See United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696 (1978); Sierra Club v. Block, 622 F. Supp. 
842 (D. Colo. 1985), appeal dismissed sub nom. Sierra Club v. Lyng, slip op. (lOth Cir. Oct. 
8, 1986), on remand, 661 F. Supp. 1490 (D. Colo. 1987). 
95 See Sierra Club v. Department of the Interior, 398 F. Supp. 184 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Sierra 
Club v. Department of the Interior, 376 F. Supp. 90 (N.D. Cal. 1974). But see Sierra Club v. 
Andrus, 487 F. Supp. 443 (D.D.C. 1980), afi'd on other grounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. 
Watt, 659 F.2d 203 (D.C. Cir. 1981). For a discussion of the application of the public trust 
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also have overridden secretarial discretion. Further, a new class of 
disputants in the public land arena have focused increasing public 
awareness on the activities of the agencies managing the nation's 
resources. Environmental groups with full-time legal staffs and an 
ability to generate grassroots support now function as a powerful 
practical limitation on the Secretary's discretion. 96 
Interior secretaries still have considerable leeway in some areas 
of public land law, but recent statutes and judgments have severely 
circumscribed much of their former authority. James G. Watt ap-
parently did not understand that historical trend when he assumed 
office in January, 1981. 
B. James Gaius Watt 
Mr. Watt, a Westerner and an avowed Sagebrush Rebel,97 entered 
office with significant experience in public land administration. 98 He 
had served on the staff of former Wyoming Senator Millard Simpson 
and had been a natural resources lobbyist for the United States 
Chamber of Commerce. Under President Nixon, Watt was a deputy 
assistant interior secretary for water and power resources and chief 
of the now-defunct Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. President Ford 
appointed him to the Federal Power Commission. From 1977 to 1980, 
Mr. Watt was president of the Mountain States Legal Foundation 
(MSLF) in Denver, an industry-supported interest group founded 
by Joseph Coors to counterbalance the rising influence of the envi-
doctrine to public land law, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: 
Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970); Symposium on the Public Trust 
Doctrine, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 180 (1980); Wilkinson, The Field of Public Land Law: Some 
Connecting Threads and Future Directions, 1 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1 (1980). On the public 
trust doctrine in state law, see National Audubon Society v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 
658 P.2d 709, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346 (1983) (water rights must be reconciled with the public trust); 
United Plainsmen Association v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Commission, 247 
N.W.2d 457, 460-63 (N.D. 1976) (state officials must consider public trust before issuing new 
water rights). 
96 Most of the litigation discussed in this Article, the effect of which has been to destroy or 
retard Secretary Watt's programs, was initiated by the Sierra Club, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council, the National Wildlife Federation, and the National Audubon Society. See 
infra note 536 and accompanying text. 
97 Drew, Reporter at Large: Secretary Watt, NEW YORKER, May 4, 1981, at 104. On the 
Sagebrush Rebellion, see infra text accompanying notes 119-42. 
98 See Culhane, Sagebrush Rebels in Office: Jim Watt's Land and Water Politics, in ENVI-
RONMENTAL POLICY IN THE 1980s: REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA 293,294-95 (N. Vig & M. Kraft 
eds. 1984) [hereinafter REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA); Senate Approves Nomination of Watt to be 
Reagan's Secretary of the Interior, 11 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1854 (1981). 
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ronmentally-oriented public interest law firms.99 Under Mr. Watt, 
the MSLF filed a number of suits challenging Interior Department 
policies and decisions that restricted resource development. 100 
New Secretary Watt soon announced his intention to change the 
way Interior conducted its business. 101 He believed that the new 
environmental laws and regulations' were standing in the way of 
necessary development, and that federal public land policy should 
favor more resource utilization.102 Mr. Watt did not test the waters 
by gradual introduction of his proposals. Instead, he sought confron-
tation with emphatic, colorful, and frequently inflammatory rheto-
ric.103 He attacked his new job at Interior with a sense of mission 
and purpose, stating flatly that he would always "err on the side of 
public use versus preservation. "104 Some described his dedication as 
religious zeal. 105 His oft-expressed disdain for conservation groups 
99 Drew, supra note 97, at 108. Coors is also one of the founders of the Heritage Foundation, 
which released its controversial guidebook, "Mandate for Leadership," as Watt was taking 
office. [d. at 110. 
100 Shortly before leaving MSLF, Mr. Watt filed a brief challenging the constitutionality of 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act. [d. at 110. Watt described his mission at 
MSLF: to "fight in the courts those bureaucrats and no-growth advocates who create a 
challenge to individual liberty and economic freedoms." [d. at 108. A list of cases undertaken 
by the MSLF during Mr. Watt's tenure there is included with the text of his confirmation 
hearings. James G. Watt Nomination: Hearings on the Proposed Nomination of James G. 
Watt to be Secretary of the Interior Before the Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 
97th Cong., 1st Sess. 32-43 (1981). 
101 Bernstein, What Hath Watt Wrought?, FORTUNE, Oct. 31, 1983, at 74. Watt stated that 
he wanted to bring about "massive changes" at Interior. 
102 Adler, supra note 12, at 22. His professed overall goal was to "open up as much land as 
I can." Stoler, Land Sale of the Century, TIME, Aug. 23, 1982, at 16. 
103 See Adler, supra note 12, at 24. 
104 Drew, supra note 97, at 128. Of park acquisitions and wilderness preservation, Mr. Watt 
said, "we have already protected most of the truly unique lands." Drew, supra note 97, at 
124. Of grazing on public lands: "to tell people how to manage their own land-that's despicable 
in America." Adler, supra note 12, at 30 (emphasis in original). On environmental regulation 
of coal mining and the Office of Surface Mining: "Embodied in this one office we find every 
abuse of government centered in one agency, directed at one industry." [d. at 32. On the 
general philosophy of public land management: "My concept of stewardship is to invest in it. 
Build a road, build a latrine, pump in running water so you can wash dishes .... Do we have 
to buy enough land so that you can go backpacking and never see anyone else?" Id. at 24. 
One person who knew Watt stated that Watt believed that "America would be better off if 
the companies were unshackled to do what they want." Drew, supra note 97, at 108. 
Watt also averred that he would "get rid of" anyone standing in his way. [d. at 112. "I plan 
to end unnecessary and burdensome regulations now frustrating America's mineral develop-
ment programs." [d. at 119. "We mean business, and when you read the press you're going 
to find that I can be cold and calculating, and indeed I can. But we are determined, and we 
are going to get hold of this thing fast .... If a personality is giving you a problem, we're 
going to get rid of the problem or the personality, whichever is faster." [d. at 112. Shortly 
after Watt made this statement, a large number of career Interior personnel were dismissed. 
105 Watt became a born-again charismatic Christian in the mid-1960s. A friend of Watt has 
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raised to new heights popular opposition to departmental policies. 106 
Many of Mr. Watt's philosophical supporters distanced themselves 
from his extreme remarks. His style left little room for compromise 
and soon predisposed perhaps a majority of the American people 
against his new initiatives even before the details of new policies 
were revealed. 107 
Within his first few months in office, Secretary Watt proposed 
major changes to almost all of Interior's programs. He also embarked 
on regulatory and budgetary revisions that would encourage devel-
opment of public resources at the expense of protection programs. 108 
As with most of Mr. Watt's initiatives, these were attempts to 
exercise his administrative discretion. Rarely did he propose new 
legislation to accomplish his aims. 109 
III. PRIVATIZING THE PUBLIC LANDS 
AMBITION, n. An overmastering desire to be vilified by enemies while 
living and made ridiculous by friends when dead. 
DUTY, n. That which sternly impels us in the direction of profit, along 
the line of desire. 
MORAL, adj. Conforming to a local and mutable standard of right. 
Having the quality of general expediency. 
Ambrose Bierce, The Devil's Dictionary, c. 1911110 
Sagebrush Rebellion advocates in the late 1970s were ambiguous 
about the details of their proposals, but their unifying theme was 
that permanent federal ownership of at least some kinds of federal 
said that he has "the most anthropocentric interpretation of Christianity-he feels that what-
ever human beings need is O. K. And he does have a religious sense of being a chosen person." 
Drew, supra note 97, at 11I. 
106 Watt always addressed the conservationists pejoratively. He sometimes called them 
"greedy land-grab[bersl." Adler, supra note 12, at 24. At other times they were just "ene-
mies," J. WATT & D. WEED, THE COURAGE OF A CONSERVATIVE 199 (1985), or those elements 
"left out on the more shrill end of the vocal spectrum." Mosher, supra note 12, at 479. Watt 
drew particularly harsh criticism when he analogized environmentalists to Nazis. Beck & 
Cook, Watt's Latest Stand, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 31, 1983, at 26. 
107 More than one million citizens signed a petition for Mr. Watt's removal. See Coggins, 
supra note 12, at 11 n.107. 
108 See infra notes 321-26 and accompanying text. 
109 Secretary Watt apparently was unable to convince Congress of the need for any major 
new public land legislation other than the Coastal Barrier Resources Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3501-
3510 (1988) (enacted 1982), a conservation measure. 
110 In, e.g., A. BIERCE, THE DEVIL'S DICTIONARY 23, 77, 223 (Tower Books ed. 1941). 
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land was immoral if not unconstitutional. III In his confirmation hear-
ings, Secretary-to-be Watt disclaimed any intention to dispose of 
large amounts of public land, stating that his ill-defined "good neigh-
bor" policies would obviate the need for wholesale disposition. 112 
As Secretary of the Interior, Mr. Watt did not openly espouse the 
more extreme aims of the Sagebrush Rebellion-which, by 1982, 
was petering out as a political force from its own internal inconsis-
tencies and unpopularity.113 The courts also assisted in the move-
ment's interment by holding that Nevada had no legal claim to 
federal lands within its borders114 and that the general twelve-year 
statute of limitations barred state claims of title against federal 
property. 115 
Despite the demise of the Rebellion, Secretary Watt's actions 
strongly indicated that his Sagebrush propensities were alive if sub-
limated. Watt's tenure saw the rebirth of Sagebrushism in the new 
guise of "privatization," moratoria on federal land acquisition, and 
attempted land exchanges to promote resource development. One 
land exchange idea supported by Secretary Watt called Project Bold, 
although not implemented during his tenure, offers promise for 
streamlining future public land management. 116 The common denom-
inator of these actions was federal title transfer. This section de-
scribes those policy initiatives and explains why they were ultimately 
unsuccessful. 
A. The Sagebrush Rebellion and Privatization 
At the heart of Secretary Watt's new policies was the plan for 
outright disposal of large tracts of public lands. The debate began 
when President Reagan announced in February, 1982 that the gov-
ernment intended to sell approximately 35 million acres of federal 
11I It is no coincidence that Nevada, one of the most ardent supporters of the Rebellion, is 
a state in which the United States owns 86.4% of the land. The BLM manages nearly 68% of 
Nevada. See PUB. LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 327 
(1970) [hereinafter PLLRC REPORT]. 
112 Proposed Nomination of James G. Watt, Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Energy 
and Natural Resources, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1981). 
lJ:l See infra notes 140-42 and accompanying text. 
114 Nevada ex rei. Nevada State Bd. of Agric. v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 166, 171-72 
(D. Nev. 1981), afl'd on other grounds, 699 F.2d 486, 487 (9th Cir. 1983). 
115 North Dakota V. Block, 461 U.S. 273, 290 (1983). Congress since has exempted state 
title claims from the limitations statute. Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(8) (Supp. v 1987). 
116 See infra text accompanying notes 200-13. 
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land.117 While some of the tracts were in the nation?.! forests118 or 
under the jurisdiction of various other agencies, thf' bulk of the lands 
proposed for sale were managed by Interior's Bureau of Land Man-
agement. James Watt was the main proponent of the plan and thus 
the focus of the controversy. Disposition versus retention of the 
public lands was hardly a new issue, but this was a new approach 
to it. 
1. The Sagebrush Rebellion 
The recent Sagebrush Rebellion had its roots in the settlement of 
the West, when the federal government long attempted to dispose 
of western lands through such legislation as the Homestead Act of 
1862,119 the Timber and Stone Lands Act of 1878,120 the Desert Lands 
Act of 1877,121 the General Mining Law of 1872,122 and the Stock-
Raising Homestead Act of 1916. 123 All of these laws gave lands to 
anyone meeting, or claiming to meet, their minimal legal condi-
tions. 124 Much land remained unclaimed into the 1930s, however, 
because it was unsuitable for agriculture, forestry, or mining. 125 By 
this time, national land policy had shifted away from unfettered 
disposal toward permanent retention and management of public do-
main lands. The Taylor Grazing Act of 1934,126 although facially an 
interim measure, actually ended the disposal era, leaving several 
hundred million acres of unreserved public domain land in long-term 
federal ownership. 127 
The lands now in the BLM's charge are the lands that no one 
wanted, either for homesteading or for national reservations. The 
western states even rejected President Hoover's attempts to give 
them outright the surface estates of those lands. 128 Later, bills were 
117 Exec. Order No. 12,348, 47 Fed. Reg. 8,547 (1982). 
118 See Forest Service Budget Up $13 Million; Soil Conservation Funds Down $118 Million, 
13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1752 (Feb. 4, 1983). 
119 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-284 (repealed 1976). 
120 43 U.S.C. §§ 311-313 (repealed 1891). 
121 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-339 (1982). 
122 30 U.S.C. §§ 21-28 (1982). 
123 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-302 (repealed 1976). 
124 See T. WATKINS & C. WATSON, THE LAND No ONE KNOWS 50-70,108 (1975) (discussing 
the provisions of the statutes). 
125 See id. at 110. 
126 43 U.S.C. § 315-315r (1982). 
127 See E. PEFFER, supra note 27, at 224. 
128 Shanks, supra note 55, at 40. Utah Governor George H. Dern's response was typical: 
"The states already own, in their school land grants, millions of acres of this same kind of 
land, which they can neither sell nor lease, and which is yielding no income. Why should they 
want more of this precious heritage of desert?" Jd.; see also E. PEFFER, supra note 27, at 
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introduced in Congress to set up a commission that would transfer 
all forest, mineral, and grazing lands to the states, but the proposal 
was dropped in the face of strong public opposition. 129 Although many 
Westerners long have resented federal control of lands, the BLM in 
fact has been a benevolent landlord, highly responsive to public land 
users. The Taylor Act subsidized grazing leases, and the BLM almost 
automatically renewed them. 130 The BLM also usually failed to reg-
ulate or challenge unperfected, unpatented mining claims, thus al-
lowing rampant abuses of the mining laws. 131 
Even so, federal ownership of land has long been a sore point in 
the West. The seeds of the most recent Sagebrush Rebellion, which 
began around 1976, were sown by new constraints on western re-
source development,132 by the Federal Land Policy and Management 
Act of 1976, and by a streak of general cussedness in some public 
land users. The Rebellion was marked by bills in state legislatures133 
and in the Congress134 to transfer the BLM lands, or, alternatively, 
the BLM and the Forest Service lands, from the federal government 
to the states. 135 The FLPMA, by formally adopting the policy that 
the public or BLM lands would be retained, was the ostensible reason 
for the controversy.136 Further, the FLPMA forced the BLM into 
an unfamiliar new role as multiple use manager and planner of vast 
national resources,137 meaning that the agency likely would become 
less responsive to the local mining and grazing interests who were 
the main leaders of the Rebellion. Anti-regulatory attitudes are 
203-13; Gregg, The Sagebrush Rebellion: What It Is, What It Isn't, and Where It's Going, 
INTERMOUNTAIN OUTDOOR SYMP., May 15, 1980, at 3. 
12" See Gregg, supra note 128, at 3. 
13U Id. at 22-23. For a good history of this era, see M. CLAWSON, supra note 37, at 8-19. 
131 J. LESHY, supra note 17, at 64-67. 
13" See, e.g., Kirschten, There's More Rhetoric than Reality in the West's "Sagebrush Re-
bellion", 11 NAT'L J. 1928 (1979). 
133 Nevada enacted a bill in July, 1979, asserting control of all federal lands within the state's 
boundaries. See Ranchers, Miners Ask State Control of Local Lands, Nev. St. J., July 12, 
1979, at 3. Shortly thereafter, similar legislation was enacted in New Mexico, Utah, and 
Wyoming. The Arizona Assembly overrode Governor Babbitt's veto of such a law. An Idaho 
Sagebrush bill was defeated in the state Senate. See Western Governor's Policy Office, 
Sagebrush Rebellion: A Background Paper 2 (1980) (unpublished briefing paper). . 
134Id. at 3. Following the lead of the state assemblies, Senator Orrin Hatch and Represen-
tatives Jim Santini and Steve Symms proposed legislation in Congress to achieve similar 
objectives. I d. 
135 See Shanks, supra note 55, at 38, 40. 
1"; See id. at 40. The FLPMA provides that "it is the policy of the United States that the 
public lands be retained in Federal ownership." 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982). Prior to this 
Act, land had been retained under the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, 43 U.S.C. §§ 315 - 315r 
(1982), which authorized withdrawal of all grazing lands for classification. Id. § 315; see also 
E. PEFFER, supra note 27, at 223. 
m See Coggins, supra note 57, at 32-33. 
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especially acute in some parts of the West, where self-initiative and 
self-reliance are a self-proclaimed way of life. 138 That mood did not 
accord well with the increasing conditions imposed on utilization of 
federal resources in the 1970s. 139 
At bottom, the Sagebrush Rebels could not agree on goals. Some 
wanted the lands transferred to private ownership, while others only 
wanted to exert pressure to force changes in the way the BLM and 
other federal agencies dealt with the commodity land users and the 
states. 140 Of those who hoped to gain state control of the land, some 
preferred that the land remain in state and local ownership, while 
others wanted the lands to pass to private ownership, although this 
latter faction was divided over who should have priority to buy 
them.141 The view held depended on whether the sales would be 
competitive or held on a preferential basis. Western ranchers, for 
example, preferred an outright sale, but only if the lands were first 
offered to them at below-market rates. 142 The Sagebrush Rebellion 
thus suffered from its own internal inconsistencies as well as from 
the popular public perception that it was really "The Great Terrain 
Robbery." 
2. Privatization 
The Reagan Administration eschewed Rebellion rhetoric,143 in-
stead portraying its land sale proposal as a business-like decision to 
reduce the federal cost of managing the land and to use the sale 
revenues for reduction of the federal deficit. On February 25, 1982, 
President Reagan created the Property Review Board (PRB or 
138 See, e.g., Stegner, Will Reagan Ride with the Raiders?, Wash. Post, Jan. 20, 1981, 
special section (Inauguration '81: The Reagan Presidency), at 33, col. 1. One observer has 
described the West as "a ranching and farming civilization at once humble and touched with 
glory, practical and myth-bound, something made up about equally of deprivation, hard work, 
muleheadedness, pride, freedom, self-sufficiency, and illusion." [d. 
139 The paradigmatic example is coal leasing: no coal was sold during the 1970s. See G. 
COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, ch. 6, § 3; Tarlock, Western Coal in Context, 53 
U. COLO. L. REV. 315 (1981); see also infra text accompanying notes 379-411. 
140 Melloan, Rebellious Mood in the West, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1979, at 16, col. 4. 
141 See id. 
142 Culhane, supra note 98, in REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA, supra note 98, at 300. 
143 Mr. Watt stated in his confirmation hearings: 
"I do not see the need at this time for a massive transfer of public lands to state and 
local control or private interests. If we do not shape up the management processes 
of these public lands, then there probably ought to be a massive transfer. 1 think 
some good management will handle those problems." 
Drew, supra note 97, at 104. 
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Board) within the Executive Office of the President. 144 The Board's 
three stated goals were: to improve management of the federal lands; 
to identify unneeded federal lands and expedite their sale to the 
private sector; and to use the land sale proceeds to reduce the federal 
deficit. 145 
With cooperation and encouragement from Secretary Watt, the 
PRB soon released an inventory of lands for sale that included 4.4 
million acres of BLM lands. The sale plan was developed without a 
hearing or any rulemaking procedures. In July, 1982, the PRB an-
nounced that the General Services Administration (GSA) would sell 
307 parcels totalling 60,000 acres. 146 The Board projected that its 
sales program would generate receipts of $1.3 billion in fiscal year 
1983, and more than $4.25 billion in each of fiscal years 1984-87. 147 
By contrast, prior GSA receipts from sales of surplus property only 
amounted to $60 million annually.148 
The PRB's plan soon ran into major legal and political obstacles. 
Conservation organizations filed suit, alleging that the Board's pro-
posed sale required preparation of an environmental impact state-
ment (EIS), and that the Administrative Procedure Act149 required 
notice of the PRB regulations governing the sale. 150 In May, 1984, 
the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts 
rejected several of the plaintiffs' substantive claims,151 but ruled that 
the PRB was an "agency" for NEP A purposes and that the sale 
constituted a major federal action requiring a programmatic EIS 
prior to any land sales. 152 Further, the PRB must give notice and an 
opportunity for hearing before promulgating rules and regulations. 153 
Although the Conservation Law Foundation's lawsuit was initially 
successful, it merely slowed the progress of the proposed land sales. 
144 Exec. Order No. 12,348, 3 C.F.R. 134--35 (1982). The Property Review Board (PRB) 
was not an independent blue-ribbon study panel. It consisted of several of the President's 
closest advisors, including William Clark, David Stockman, and Edwin Meese. See Conser-
vation Law Found. v. Harper, 587 F. Supp. 357, 362 (D. Mass. 1984). 
145 See 3 C.F.R. 134--35 (1982). 
146 See Hooper, Privatizatiorlr---The Reagan Administration's Master Plan for Government 
Giveaways, SIERRA, Nov.-Dec. 1982, at 34; Shabecoff, U.S. Plans Biggest Land Shift Since 
Frontier Times, N.Y. Times, July 3, 1982, at 1, col. 3. 
147 Harper, 587 F. Supp. at 362. 
148 [d. at 362-63. 
149 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1988). 
150 Harper, 587 F. Supp. at 363-65. 
151 On the merits, the district court ruled that the sales program did not violate the retention 
provision of FLPMA, 43 U. S. C. § 1713 (1982), because the plaintiffs had produced no evidence 
to show that the PRB failed to meet FLPMA's disposal criteria. Harper, 587 F. Supp. at 369. 
152 Harper, 587 F. Supp. at 362-65. 
153 [d. at 367-68. 
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The plan to privatize the public lands was halted primarily by polit-
ical resistance, some of which came from the western states. Western 
governors passed a resolution opposing any land sales held without 
their consultation. 154 Attempting to smooth ruffled feathers, Watt 
acknowledged that the PRB "did a miserable job," and that criticism 
of the program to sell the public lands was "for the most part 
justified."155 Land sales by the PRB through June, 1983 totalled only 
4,600 acres and brought in only about $4.8 million. 156 The Property 
Review Board was then disbanded and the large-scale privatization 
program abandoned. 
The public nationwide did not support the proposed sale of lands 
because the Reagan Administration never presented a compelling 
reason for it. The touted economic efficiency of the sale program was 
unrealistic. The proceeds would have done little to overcome the 
huge federal deficit,157 particularly when many of the tracts would 
have been sold at below-market prices. 15s Further, the objective of 
the privatization plan was unabashedly short-term, a view at odds 
with the widely-accepted view that the government is the manager 
and custodian of the public lands for future generations. 159 The grow-
ing urban Sun Belt populations, steadily increasing recreational use 
of the federal lands, and a growing awareness of the strategic im-
portance of federally-owned minerals all buttressed the case for 
retention of the public lands. 
Many believed that the groups most vocally supporting privati-
zation were the powerful ranching, mining, logging, and land spec-
154 Watt Says Review Board Out of Land Sales But McClure Calls For Board's Abolishment, 
14 Env't Rep. (BNA) 619 (Aug. 12, 1983). 
155Id. at 620. 
156 Culhane, supra note 98, in REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA, supra note 98, at 300. 
157 Even if the Administration had met its ambitious land sale targets, total receipts over 
the PRB's projected five-year life would have totalled only about $5.5 billion, a miniscule 
portion of the annual federal deficit then around $200 billion. 
158 See Culhane, supra note 98, in REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA, supra note 98, at 300. 
159 See Stoler, supra note 102, at 17-19; see alsoJ. KRUTILLA & A. FISHER, THE ECONOMICS 
OF NATURAL ENVIRONMENTS 19-74 (1975). Professor Sax has noted the contradiction between 
free market economics and the use of federal government ownership as a means of preserving 
lands for public use and for posterity: 
The federal government as a landlord of hundreds of millions of acres of quite 
ordinary land is an anomaly in both American tradition and thought. Large-scale 
federal ownership has no explicit basis in the Constitution, was never anticipated by 
the framers and is inconsistent with 150 years of disposition history. Indeed, it is 
particularly anomalous in this country, which-unlike so many others-abjures public 
ownership of telephone and telegraph, railroads, airlines, gas and electric utilities 
and other major features of the economy. 
Sax, supra note 12, at 313. That contradiction, however, is now firmly embedded in American 
assumptions. See, e.g., Coggins, supra note 12, at 26-27. 
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ulation interests who stood to benefit the most. 160 Western ranching 
interests, however, would support the program only if the land was 
sold at well below market prices. 161 But privatization through sub-
sidies and giveaways was inconsistent with the Administration's 
justification that the sales were necessary to generate revenue and 
to allow operation of free-market forc'es. 162 Mr. Watt's claim that the 
privatization of resources was an economically efficient program ap-
peared to be a thinly veiled excuse to impose on the country his own 
philosophical conviction that federal ownership was just plain wrong. 
B. The Moratorium on Parkland Acquisition and the Hit List 
Every year the United States reacquires a substantial number of 
additional tracts for various purposes,163 and it also sells, grants, 
and exchanges lands annually. The government purchases and con-
demns inholdings in national parks, national wildlife refuges, and 
wilderness areas,164 as well as easements and lands bordering wild 
and scenic rivers, 165 and lands for new parks. 166 Since 1965, Congress 
has funded purchases of recreational land through the Land and 
Water Conservation Fund (LWCF).167 Obviously, a philosophy that 
regards federal ownership as odious would wish to halt if not reverse 
federal land reacquisition. 
Mr. Watt first responded to this "problem" by reducing spending 
for national parkland acquisition from an average of $284 million in 
160 See Drew, supra note 97, at 118; Stoler, supra note 102, at 17. 
161 Culhane, supm note 98, in REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA, supra note 98, at 300. 
162Id, 
168 See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE FEDERAL DRIVE TO ACQUIRE PRIVATE LANDS 
SHOULD BE REASSESSED 1 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 GAO REPORT]. 
164 "Inholdings" are private parcels within federal reservation boundaries, See Lambert, 
Private Landholdings in the National Parks: Examples From Yosemite National Park and 
Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, 6 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 35, 36-37 (1982). 
165 See 1979 GAO REPORT, supra note 163, app. I at 71-73 (Chattooga River); id. at 100-
02 (Rogue River); Buffalo National River, Arkansas: Hearings on S. 7 Before the Subcomm. 
on Parks and Recreation of the Sen. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 8 (1971). 
166 See 1979 GAO REPORT, supra note 163, at 4. The NPS spent $815 million between 1965 
and 1977 to purchase 977,000 acres of land from over 45,000 property owners. Id. 
167 Land and Water Conservation Act of 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 460l-4 to -11 (1982). The LWCF 
was established in 1964 to alleviate the necessity of obtaining appropriations for parks from 
general revenues. The money comes from earmarked receipts from various sources, including 
offshore oil and gas leases. The LWCF has two components-grants to state governments 
and money for land acquisition by the NPS, FWS, ELM, and USFS. Originally, the Fund 
was authorized at $50 million; by 1970, it had grown to $300 million. See Futrell, Parks to the 
People: New Directions for the National Park System, 25 EMORY L.J. 255, 262--63 (1976). 
When Mr. Watt took office, annual authorizations approached $1 billion. See Glicksman & 
Coggins, Federal Recreational Land Policy: The Rise and Decline of the Land and Water 
Conservation Fund, 9 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 125, 160 (1983). 
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the last three years of the Carter Administration to $76 million in 
the first full year of the Reagan Administration. 168 Congress, how-
ever, continued to authorize parkland purchases and to appropriate 
LWCF money for acquisitions. 169 The Secretary then declared a 
moratorium on all purchases for parkland. He simply refused to 
spend any of the monies Congress had appropriated for this purpose 
from the LWCF, except in a few very limited instances. 170 His stated 
rationale for the moratorium was that the funds were better spent 
for improvements to existing physical park facilities.171 In addition, 
it was widely believed-in spite of departmental denials-that Mr. 
Watt had prepared a "hit list" of newly authorized urban park units 
that in his view should be de-authorized. 172 
While philosophically consistent, Mr. Watt's efforts to prevent 
federal land reacquisition through the moratorium were successful 
only during his short tenure, and the alleged hit list was futile. The 
moratorium was never reviewed by a court, but withholding appro-
priated and earmarked funds without following the procedures spec-
ified by statute seems clearly if not blatantly illegal. 173 Regardless 
of legality, the moratorium and the hit list rumors galvanized influ-
ential members of Congress as well as the conservation community 
who deplored delaying completion of authorized parks as short-
sighted. Secretary Clark, Mr. Watt's successor, altered the mora-
torium. 174 The pace of reacquisition since has been slow, but the post-
Watt Reagan and Bush Administrations seem to have dropped ad-
amant opposition to new federal lands. 175 
Politicians generally favor national parks because parks involve 
high visibility from heavy usage,176 are popular with local voters, 177 
and cost relatively small amounts of money. 178 Mr. Watt apparently 
168 Glicksman & Coggins, supra note 167, at 163-64. 
169Id. at 179-80; see also Pub. Land News, July 9, 1981, at 4. 
170 Glicksman & Coggins, supra note 167, at 125-26; see also Bumpers, of All People, 
Revives Idea of "Hit List," Pub. Land News, May 14, 1981, at 4-5 [hereinafter Bumpers 
Revives "Hit List"]. 
171 See Glicksman & Coggins, supra note 167, at 164-67. 
172 Bumpers Revives "Hit List," supra note 170, at 4-5; see Tinianow, In Defense of Federal 
Parks Near Urban Areas, 14 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 567 (1981). 
173 See Glicksman & Coggins, supra note 167, at 184-229. 
174 Id. at 126-27. 
175 E.g., Kansas City Times, Dec. 19, 1989, § A, at 3, col. 1 (OMB proposes excise taxes for 
conservation acquisitions). 
176 See, e.g., Futrell, supra note 167, at 260-61 (parks are frequently used for such activities 
as hiking, picnicking, swimming, and boating). 
177 Proponents of a "hit list" assailed the authorization of so many new parks as pure "park-
barrel[ing]." Bumpers Revives "Hit List," supra note 170, at 5. 
178 The amount of the LWC Fund appropriated to the NPS has varied from a low of $910,000 
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did not take that combination of factors adequately into account. 
Although the Secretary used GAO reports critical of federal land 
acquisition policies179 as ammunition for his crusade, he might have 
been more successful had he also followed the GAO's recommenda-
tions to substitute or supplement outright acquisition with the pur-
chase of easements and management agreements with private land-
owners to permit more effective management of the national park 
lands. 180 He might also have taken a lesson from the reaction to 
President Carter's unpopular "hit list" of water development proj-
ects. Because Secretary Watt failed to heed history, law, and politics, 
the ideological pendulum did not swing back appreciably. 
C. The St. Matthew's Island Exchange 
Both the privatization program and the moratorium on parkland 
acquisition were at least arguably unlawful because no statute au-
thorized either initiative. Several statutes, on the other hand, ex-
pressly contemplate land exchanges that serve certain federal inter-
ests. The FLPMA, chief among these laws, consolidates early 
exchange provisions,181 and the Alaska National Interest Lands Con-
servation Act of 1980 (ANILCA)182 authorizes the Secretary to ex-
change lands in Alaska. Under ANILCA, only two loose conditions 
need be met if the exchanged lands are of unequal value: the new 
federal lands must advance some ANILCA purpose; and the ex-
change must be in the "public interest."l83 Mr. Watt tried to use the 
ANILCA authority to assist private resource development at the 
expense of wilderness values, but the federal court for the District 
of Alaska ruled that the Watt conception of the public interest dif-
fered radically from what Congress had in mind. 184 
in 1974 to a high of $367 million in 1978. In most years, the NPS appropriation averaged less 
than $100 million. Public Land Management Policy: Hearings on the Impact of Acquisition 
Delays on the Lands and Resources of the National Park System Before the Subcomm. on 
Public Lands and National Parks of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 63, 64, 69 (1983) (testimony of Russell Dickenson, NPS Director). 
179 1979 GAO REPORT, supra note 163; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE LAND 
ACQUISITIONS IN NATIONAL PARKS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED (1976). 
180 See 1979 GAO REPORT, supra note 163, at 23-25, 30, 35; Sax, Helpless Giants: The 
National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH. L. REV. 239, 244-45 (1976). 
181 43 U.S.C.A. § 1716 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). For a discussion ofJand exchanges under 
the FLPMA, see Anderson, Public Land Exchanges, Sales, and Purchases Under the Federal 
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 657. 
182 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1982). 
183 See id. § 3192(h). 
184 National Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825 (D. Alaska 1984). 
500 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:473 
St. Matthew's, an uninhabited island in the Aleutians, has been a 
wildlife refuge since 1909 and a wilderness area since 1970. 185 Mr. 
Watt proposed to exchange a portion of the island for inholdings in 
other Alaskan wildlife refuges owned by Native corporations. 186 The 
purpose of the exchange was to facilitate oil and gas development in 
the area. The Native corporations would lease the exchanged lands 
to oil companies for an air support base, refinery, and natural gas 
processing facility. 187 
The resulting litigation disclosed that the Department had done a 
much better job of its homework than it usually did during Mr. 
Watt's tenure. l88 The Secretary's "Record of Decision" and "Deter-
mination" isolated seven factors relevant to the public interest in 
the exchange and discussed each factor at some length. 189 The re-
viewing court approved this broad approach.190 The court went 
on, however, to find that the Secretary was simply wrong in his 
public interest analysis because he overstated the benefits that 
would accrue for wildlife protection while understating the dam-
age that likely would inure to the wildlife habitat of the island. 191 
185 [d. at 828. 
186 See id. Native corporations hold land in Alaska for the benefit of their tribal constituents. 
These interests included nondevelopment easements in three areas-two in the Yukon Delta 
National Wildlife Refuge and one in the Kenai National Wildlife Refuge. See id. at 827. 
187 [d. The conveyance was to have been for 50 years, or so long as commercial oil production 
activities continued in the vicinity. [d. 
188 For examples of poor legal preparation, see National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 835 
F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 
848 (E.D. Cal. 1985). 
189 See 606 F. Supp. at 829. Secretary Watt asserted that the transfer furthered the purposes 
of ANILCA by consolidating recreational and wildlife habitat lands within the National 
Wildlife Refuge System, by reducing potential inconsistent Native land use within the other 
two refuges, and by lowering Native selection conveyance time and expense. As for furthering 
the public interest, the Secretary concluded that the exchange would eliminate private in-
holdings in the other two refuges, that the land received was three times the acreage on St. 
Matthew's Island, and that economic benefits would accrue to the area. Further, the agreement 
noted that Interior would receive land heavily used by the public, "while only temporarily 
disposing of land on St. Matthew Island lacking recreational potential. " [d. 
190 [d. at 835-36. 
191 See id. at 842. The court concluded that the exchange "suffer[edl from serious errors of 
judgment and misapplication of law which have led to a clear error of judgment." [d. at 846. 
The two land interests in the Yukon Delta NWR were already protected under section 22 of 
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), 43 U.S.C. § 1621(g) (1982), which decreed 
that all patents issued by the Secretary of the Interior to Native corporations for lands within 
an NWR "shall contain a provision that such lands remain subject to the laws and regulations 
governing use and development of such Refuge." 606 F. Supp. at 837. One of the interests 
was subject to additional development restrictions under section 14(h) of ANSCA and was in 
no danger of degradation. [d. at 841. Of the Kenai NWR lands, about half of the land was 
already protected by sections 14(h) and 22; the other half, the court conceded, amounted to a 
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The decision to proceed was therefore an enjoinable abuse of 
discretion. 192 
The St. Matthew's Island lawsuit not only halted a small part of 
Mr. Watt's resource development program, it also set a precedent 
of potentially historic proportions. Courts, of course, have long as-
sessed public interest considerations both in ascertaining substantive 
authority193 and in evaluating procedural remedies. 194 But the St. 
Matthew's Island case apparently is the first instance in which a 
court has reviewed in depth a formal public interest determination 
necessary to perform an otherwise discretionary function by the 
Secretary and found the determination to be so lacking in substance 
as to be arbitrary and capricious. Given the vast number of statutes 
that refer to the public interest as a (or the) factor in decisionmak-
ing,195 the court's opinion could have important implications. 
Unlike its eventual retreat from the land privatization program 
and the reacquisition moratorium, the Department did not abandon 
the use of land exchanges to advance private economic aims. After 
the departure of Mr. Watt, the Department worked out a deal 
whereby it would exchange mineral estates in lands on the coastal 
plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), where vast 
quantities of oil and gas are thought to exist, to Native corporations 
in exchange for lands elsewhere. 196 Again, the purpose was to assist 
oil companies who could then lease from the Native corporations 
free of many environmental and other restraints imposed on federal 
lessees. 197 The storm of protest generated by the disclosure of the 
"under-the-table" arrangement forced Interior to concede that it 
genuine increase in recreation access. Id. The court noted, however, that there was no existing 
threat to recreation potential. I d. 
192Id. at 827. 
193 E.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 471-74 (1915) (government may 
withdraw or reserve parts of the public domain when it serves the public interest); cf. LaRue 
v. Udall, 324 F.2d 428, 431 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (even under a restricted view of the meaning of 
the statutory words "public interests," it is clearly the Secretary's duty, in considering a 
proposed land exchange, to consider its net result). 
194 E.g., American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962,965-67 (9th Cir. 1983); National 
Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1616 (D.D.C. 1985), aff'd, 835 
F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
195 In the FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982), for instance, the phrases "public interest," 
"national interest," and "public objectives" frequently recur. 
196 Interior Characterizes Land Swap Talks as Way to Acquire High-Value Wildlife Habitat, 
18 Env't Rep. (BNA) 911-12 (July 31, 1987) [hereinafter Interior Characterizes Talks]. 
197 Federal oil and gas leasing is a phased process with built-in environmental safeguards at 
each step. See, e.g., Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. 
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1340 (1989). 
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would not complete the exchange without congressional sanction. 198 
Congress since has refused to open the ANWR. 199 Should the pro-
posed exchange arrangement proceed without affirmative legislative 
blessing, the St. Matthew's Island case stands as a considerable 
obstacle. 
D. Project Bold 
The defeat of the three foregoing privatization initiatives, each 
premised to an extent on the notion that federal ownership itself is 
contrary to the public interest, may have contributed to the defeat 
of one of Mr. Watt's more worthwhile objectives, the streamlining 
of public land management through "Project Bold." In essence, the 
Bold proposal called for a massive exchange of lands between the 
State of Utah and the United States. 
Utah, like many western states, owns a great deal of land within 
its borders, largely the legacy of its statehood act which granted the 
state four sections of federal land in each township.200 Much of that 
state land remains interspersed among federal holdings, making 
federal management difficult and state management next to impos-
sible.201 Only large parcels can be effectively managed in much of 
the semiarid Intermountain Basin. Over the years, parcel-by-parcel 
exchanges to alleviate the obvious difficulties proved to be slow, 
awkward, and unavailing.202 Utah's Governor Scott Matheson, with 
Mr. Watt's enthusiastic concurrence, proposed to cut the Gordian 
Knot by exchanging all isolated state parcels for blocks of federal 
land. 203 When completed, the swap would have consolidated the 
holdings of both sovereigns into more manageable units. 
As originally envisioned, Utah would have exchanged more than 
3.2 million of its acres for federal land of roughly equal value, some 
containing fuel and nonfuel minerals. 204 The federal government 
thereby would have received title to scattered state inholdings in 
BLM wilderness study areas, national wildlife refuges, national 
parks, and national forests,205 thus eliminating the need to buy these 
198 Interior Characterizes Talks, supra note 196, at 911-12. 
199 See Pub. Land News, Apr. 13, 1987, at l. 
200 See Andrus v. Utah, 446 U.S. 500, 502 (1980). 
201 Matheson & Becker, Improving Public Land Management Through Land Exchange: 
Opportunities and Pitfalls of the Utah Experience, 33 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 4-1 (1987). 
202Id. 
203 See Huge Utah Exchange Aired, Legislation To Be Sought, Pub. Land News, Nov. 11, 
1982, at 5-7 [hereinafter Huge Utah Exchangel. 
204 Id. at 5. 
205Id. at 7. The original proposal also envisioned transfer of some BLM wilderness study 
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lands when they presented threats to the federal reservations. 206 
The plan became more complex as the parties encountered difficulty 
in exchanging mineral rights under two different allocation sys-
tems. 207 Ensuring equal valuation also presented problems, and a 
tract-by-tract analysis would have been inefficient and time-consum-
ing. 
Despite the mutual enthusiasm, Project Bold has not been con-
summated. Many parties affected-environmentalists, ranchers, and 
hardrock miners-found some reason for opposition.208 Ranchers 
feared they would lose their preference grazing rights,209 and miners 
feared that Utah would attempt to lease mineral lands once the 
transfer was complete. Private interests, supportive of Watt pro-
posals to sell public lands to them under preferential arrangements, 
became more protective of their federal privileges when faced with 
the prospect of stricter state resource management. 
Project Bold passed through the Utah legislature with many 
concessions, but it received little support from the Utah delegation 
on Capitol Hill. 210 Undaunted, Interior proposed a scaled-down ap-
proach more palatable to Congress, but the Utah legislature and the 
new Utah governor were less enthusiastic about the project.2l1 
Although the new governor, the new Interior Secretary, and Con-
gress promised to consider the revised proposal, the exchange has 
not progressed. What appeared to be a promising opportunity for 
improved management of western resources became mired in the 
areas to the State, which would prevent their designation as wilderness, but these were later 
deleted from the deal to reduce political opposition. See New Project Bold Plan Would Split 
Revenues 50-50, Pub. Land News, July 19, 1984, at 4 [hereinafter New Project Bold Plan]. 
206 See Coggins, Protecting the Wildlife Resources of National Parks From External 
Threats, 22 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1986); Keiter, On Protecting the National Parks 
From the External Threats Dilemma, 20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 355 (1985); Sax & Keiter, 
Glacier National Park and Its Neighbors: A Study of Federal Interagency Relations, 14 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 207 (1987). 
207 See Matheson & Becker, supra note 201; Huge Utah Exchange, supra note 203, at 6. 
Utah leases all minerals, while federal mineral claimants can mine free of charge and acquire 
fee title to the land. Utah wanted to give existing federal mineral right holders 10 years to 
make a valuable discovery and patent the land; after that time it would open the lands to 
competitive leasing. 
208 Utah Miners Pick at Project Bold But Compromise Possible, Pub. Land News, June 
23, 1983, at 6; Huge Utah Exchange, supra note 203, at 7. 
209 Huge Utah Exchange, supra note 203, at 7. 
210 Long Knives Are Out as Project Bold is Introduced, Pub. Land News, Apr. 12, 1984, at 
3-4; see also Bold Moves to Capitol Hill But Bill Introduction Delayed, Pub. Land News, 
Feb. 2, 1984, at 7. 
211 See State Committee Asks Project Bold Delay, Supporters Back on Track, Pub. Land 
News, Aug. 2, 1984, at 4. Interior's new proposal included a 50/50 sharing of mineral revenues 
from all exchanged lands. Utah feared that it would lose significant oil and gas revenues as 
compared with the original proposal. See id. 
504 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:473 
complexity of entrenched federal land management practices when 
opposition surfaced from interest groups who saw many of their 
subsidized benefits threatened. Governor Matheson and Secretary 
Watt apparently underestimated the inertial power of the status 
quo. Mr. Watt's perceived general overzealousness also may have 
contributed to the failure of this promising approach. 
The Sagebrush Rebellion now is little more than a faint memory, 
disowned by all save a clique of ideological economists. 212 Secretary 
Watt's post-Sagebrush privatization efforts similarly went down in 
inglorious flames, and even his defensive strategy of refusing to 
purchase new parkland was immediately disavowed by his successor. 
While conservationists may justly regard the failure of privatization 
as a gain for the conservation cause, they should also be dismayed 
that Project Bold, a good idea whose time ought to have come, was 
thrown (lut with the bathwater. In any event, the 1976 congressional 
decision to retain the public lands in federal ownership213 has been 
emphatically reaffirmed by these developments, and the pendulum 
of federal land history ultimately was unaffected. 
IV. RECLASSIFYING THE PUBLIC LANDS 
Who overcomes 
By force, hath overcome but half his foe. 
John Milton, Paradise Lost214 
The privatization vision of Secretary Watt initially encompassed 
only about five percent of federal land holdings. Even if that vision 
became reality, management of the remaining lands would still be a 
far greater challenge. Mr. Watt's land management ppilosophy could 
be summed up, for the most part, in one sentence: The government 
should remove all obstacles to development and use of all public 
resources as soon as possible. Section V of this Article discusses 
some of the means chosen by the Watt Administration to expedite 
development of lands already open to development. This section 
212 See, e.g., FORESTLANDS PUBLIC AND PRIVATE (R. Deacon & M. Johnson eds. 1985) 
[hereinafter FORESTLANDS]; G. LIBECAP, LOCKING Up THE RANGE (1981); R. STROUP & J. 
BADEN, NATURAL RESOURCES-BuREAUCRATIC MYTHS AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGE-
MENT (1983). 
213 Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976,43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(1) (1982). 
2141 J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST 28 (A.W. Verityed. 1934). 
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examines efforts during the Watt tenure to open more federal lands 
to development by reclassification or jurisdictional transfer. 
The categories into which federal parcels of land fall beggar de-
scription. To say that there are five major lands systems managed 
by four agencies in two departments only gives the very general 
outline of federal lands nomenclature. A parcel managed by the 
National Park Service, for instance, could be classified as a park, 
monument, recreation area, wilderness, trail, scenic river, lake-
shore, seashore, battlefield, cultural area, and so forth. A BLM 
parcel could be designated as a wilderness area, a conservation area, 
a power site withdrawal, an unpatented mining claim, an area of 
critical environmental concern, a wildlife sanctuary, or even unre-
served, unwithdrawn public land. These lists are not exhaustive. 
The number of labels likely is excessive, but those labels determine 
the initial availability of federal parcels for use, although actual use 
usually must await some variety of federal permission. The more 
restrictive the classification, the fewer the permissible uses. 
Secretary Watt attempted to open more federal land to economic 
use in three ways: by reclassifying the parcel to eliminate barriers 
to use; by preventing reclassification of a parcel to a more restrictive 
category; and by transferring jurisdiction over the parcel to an 
agency more attuned to development. His ventures in this realm 
met with a near-total lack of success. As in the case of privatization, 
opposition to anything proposed by Mr. Watt helped defeat an idea 
with promise for making public land management more efficient. 
A. Terminating Classifications and Revoking Withdrawals 
Restricting use of a federal parcel by classification or withdrawal 
has been a point of friction between the legislative and executive 
branches for more than a century.215 In public land law, "classifica-
tion" means designating a parcel as being more valuable for some 
uses than others, and "withdrawal" means making the parcel un-
available for some uses. 216 The Supreme Court in the 1915 landmark 
Midwest Oil217 opinion declared that Congress had conferred a non-
statutory general withdrawal power on the President by congres-
sional acquiescence in earlier executive withdrawals. The Pickett 
215 See Getches, Managing the Public Lands: The Authority of the Executive to Withdraw 
Lands, 22 NAT. RESOURCES J. 279 (1982). 
216 See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, ch. 4, § A. 
217 United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 477-81 (1915). 
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Act of 1910218 authorized the President to withdraw lands from all 
uses except metalliferous entry when the President thought with-
drawal would serve a public purpose, but later decisions held that 
the Pickett Act did not restrict presidential power to withdraw land 
even from metalliferous entry so long as Congress continued to 
acquiesce. 219 
Many early withdrawals (for military use, bird sanctuaries, and 
so forth) became permanent reservations, and the ad hoc executive 
exercises of the withdrawal power from 1910 to 1976 closed a sub-
stantial part of the erstwhile public domain to the prohibited uses 
enumerated in the withdrawal orders.220 The Taylor Grazing Act of 
1934221 and the 1964 Classification and Multiple Use Act (CMUA)222 
direct the BLM to "classify" lands for certain purposes,223 and the 
classifications remained after the CMUA expired in 1970. The uses 
prohibited by withdrawals and classifications often include mineral 
location and mineral leasing as well as settlement. By 1976, the map 
of the public lands was a crazyquilt of new and old withdrawals and 
classifications, many of which were overlapping and obsolete. 224 
With the 1976 FLPMA, Congress asserted legislative control over 
classification of federal land, hoping to bring long-term order to the 
cartographic chaos. FLPMA retains both classification and with-
drawal as methods of restricting federal land use. 225 The statutory 
procedures for invoking or revoking both methods include opportu-
nities for public participation,226 promulgation of rules and regula-
tions governing revocations,227 and submission to the President and 
the Congress of the Secretary's recommendations for withdrawal 
revocations. 228 
218 Pickett Act of 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847, repealed by Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. § 141 (1982). 
219 Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Kleppe, 441 F. Supp. 859, 862 (D. Wyo. 1977), and authorities 
cited therein. 
220 See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, ch. 3, § A; Getches, supra note 215, 
at 285-86. 
221 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1982). 
222Id. §§ 1411-1418 (1970) (expired 1970). 
223Id. §§ 315j, 1411. 
224 See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, MANAGEMENT OF FUEL AND NONFUEL 
MINERALS IN FEDERAL LAND 215-20 (1979) (discussing withdrawals and urging an accounting 
of the use status of federal land and a coordinating of mineral and nonmineral uses) [hereinafter 
1979 OTA REPORT); Bennethum & Lee, Is Our Account Overdrawn?, MINING CONGRESS J., 
Sept. 1975, at 33. 
225 43 U.S.C. §§ 1714 (1982) (withdrawal), 1712(d) (classification). 
226Id. §§ 1712(a), 1739(e). 
227Id. § 1740. 
228Id. § 1714(l). 
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Between 1981 and 1985, the Interior Department terminated prior 
classifications on nearly 161 million acres of public land and revoked 
withdrawals covering twenty million acres, mostly on BLM lands. 229 
Obviously, the Department could not fully consider the merits of 
each individual revocation in a program of that magnitude. That the 
terminations were prompted more by ideology than management 
requirements or demonstrated need was equally obvious. The De-
partment apparently took great pains to ignore or circumvent the 
statutory requirements for reclassification and withdrawal revoca-
tions. As a consequence of litigation challenging those decisions, the 
status of those 180 million acres has been in limbo for six years, with 
no resolution in sight. 
The courts preliminarily found the terminations and revocations 
unlawful in 1985 and 1987, dismissed the lawsuit in 1988, and rein-
stated the litigation in 1989. The district court in National Wildlife 
Federation v. Burford230 had little trouble finding that the revoca-
tions of both classifications and withdrawals should be preliminarily 
enjoined, even without addressing most of the plaintiffs' conten-
tions.231 The court first declared that FLPMA drew a clear line 
between classifications and withdrawals. 232 The law allows reclassi-
fication only as a part of the land use planning process, and specifies 
that modification or termination of a classification must be "consis-
tent with such land use plans. "233 Few if any land use plans under 
FLPMA had been completed when the revocations commenced. 234 
The Department argued that the preexisting Management Frame-
work Plans (MFPs) were "such" land use plans,235 a tortured mis-
229 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1610 (D.D.C. 
1985), aff'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
230 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1609, 1610 (D. D.C. 1985), aff'd, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
231 One difficult issue in the case was the effect of the judgment on nonjoined third parties. 
The Department claimed that thousands of rights or interests-mainly mineral locations and 
mineral leases, but also grants to municipalities-had been initiated on the subject lands in 
reliance on the revocations, and it asserted that all with such claims were indispensable parties 
to the litigation. Id. at 1612. The Burford court disagreed. It found that they were necessary 
parties whose interests could be affected, but that their joinder was not necessary for juris-
diction because their interests were adequately represented, permanent harm to them was 
only speculative, the plaintiff otherwise would be denied a forum, and the case was within 
the "public rights" exception to the indispensable party doctrine. Id. at 1614. 
232 I d. at 1615. 
233 43 U.S.C. § 1712(d) (1982). 
234 Indeed, the BLM's chief planner has indicated that the agency does not intend to prepare 
plans for all of its lands. Williams, Planning Approaches in Bureau of Land Management, 
24 TRENDS No.2, at 27 (1987). The BLM refusal to plan apparently contravenes the congres-
sional command in 43 U.S.C. § 1712(a) (1982). 
235 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1614-15. 
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construction of the statutory language referring to "any land use 
plan developed pursuant to this section. "236 The court found more 
broadly that the reclassifications were attempts to evade both the 
"consistent with" language and the section 1712 command to develop 
land use plans. 237 
The court then held that the withdrawals were also unlawful be-
cause the BLM afforded no opportunity for public participation in 
this facet of public land management.238 The withdrawals probably 
violated other FLPMA procedural provisions as well, but the court 
did not reach those questions.239 The plaintiffs, stated the court, 
clearly demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, and the 
public interest favored injunctive relief. 240 
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed, di-
recting the district court to expedite the trial on the merits.241 The 
district court instead dismissed the case, ruling that the plaintiffs 
lacked standing, a decision that the appellate court summarily re-
versed. 242 At this writing, therefore, the revocations and termina-
tions ordered by Secretary Watt in 1981-83 are still in litigation and 
presumptively invalid, leaving all persons with claims established 
since 1981 in untenably precarious positions. 
This bollixed-up situation illustrates a Watt Administration ten-
dency to regard rather cavalierly the statutes with which it disa-
greed or that were inconvenient. 243 The result was certainly incon-
venient not only to the Department, but also to those who may have 
relied and invested in good faith because of the departmental actions. 
The lessons from this snafu apparently remained unlearned: instead 
of going back and revoking correctly, the Department appealed to 
Congress. 244 Congress eventually allowed pending land exchange 
236 43 U.S.C. § 1712(d) (1982). The court held that the BLM's Management Framework 
Plans (MFPs) for each grazing district could only be relied upon temporarily, since the Interior 
regulations themselves identified the land-use plans as Resource Management Plans (RMPs), 
distinct from MFPs. See 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1614-15; 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-5(k) (1984). 
237 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1614-15. 
238 [d. at 1615 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 1739(e) (1982)). 
239 Section 1714(l) of FLPMA institutes a general procedure for withdrawal revocation which 
the Department evidently ignored. 
240 23 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1616. 
241 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
242 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 699 F. Supp. 327, 332 (D. D.C. 1988), rev'd, 878 F.2d 
422 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
243 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 
1985); see also infra notes 516-22 and accompanying text. 
244 Address by BLM Director Robert Burford, New Mexico State Bar Ass'n, Santa Fe, 
N.M. (Sept. 25, 1987). 
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proposals to proceed with additional safeguards,245 but otherwise 
rejected legislative relief. If the BLM had complied with the statu-
tory requirements, its decisions would have rested on firmer foun-
dations. Without further congressional intervention, the lands likely 
will remain withdrawn and restrictively classified for some time to 
come. 
B. Paring Down the BLM Wilderness Study 
The Watt program for opening lands to development not only 
included the offensive strategy of revoking existing classifications 
and withdrawals, but it also sought as a defensive measure to pre-
vent reclassification of federal parcels to more restrictive categories. 
Wilderness generally is the most restrictive classification in federal 
law. 246 When Secretary Watt took office, the BLM was reviewing all 
of its lands for wilderness potential as required by the 1976 
FLPMA.247 Only Congress may finally designate an area as official 
wilderness. The agency, however, must conduct extensive studies 
and report its recommendations to the President and Congress. 248 
Data collection and formalization of the inventory process began in 
1978, but few substantive land classification decisions had been made 
by 1981. FLPMA's instructions to the BLM on the required wilder-
ness study are general,249 leaving the Secretary of the Interior broad 
authority to fill in study procedure details. The BLM's process con-
sisted of three phases: (1) inventory (subdivided into initial inventory 
and intensive inventory); (2) study; and (3) submission of a report to 
Congress. 250 
By 1981, the BLM had identified twenty-three million acres as 
wilderness study areas (WSAs). As an initial matter, that number 
245 Federal Land Exchange Facilitation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-409, 102 Stat. 1086 
(codified in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C. and 43 U.S.C.). 
246 Watt labelled wilderness designation as a "greedy land-grab by the preservationists." 
Adler, supra note 12, at 24. 
247 43 U. S. C. § 1782 (1982). 
248 I d. § 1782(a). 
249 The FLPMA's broad wilderness study directions are contained in 43 U. S. C. § 1782(a) 
(1982). The Act directs the Secretary to "review" roadless areas and make recommendations 
to the President and Congress as to the suitability of areas for wilderness designation. I d. 
250 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, INTERIOR MANAGE-
MENT POLICY AND GUIDELINES FOR WILDERNESS STUDY AREAS 6 (1979). This three-tiered 
process allows public comments at various stages of the process, and identifies some criteria 
for evaluating wilderness areas. Nonetheless, the broad statutory guidelines of FLPMA, 
coupled with the slippery, somewhat subjective definition of wilderness, 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) 
(1988), means that BLM officials have broad discretion in deciding whether an area should go 
forward in the process or be quietly dropped. 
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seemed small in relation to the more than 170 million acres outside 
Alaska managed by the agency,251 and many environmentalists be-
lieved that Secretary Watt thereafter took a much too restrictive 
view of the process. Deletion of many individual pristine roadless 
areas from consideration for wilderness designation provoked a se-
ries of administrative adjudications in which the challengers have 
had limited success.252 
Mr. Watt's more general attempts to exclude classes of lands from 
wilderness consideration, on the other hand, were emphatically re-
jected by a federal district court. Three Interior Board of Land 
Appeals (IBLA)253 decisions precipitated wholesale deletions of pre-
viously designated WSAs. In 1981, the IBLA ruled in Tri-County 
Cattlemen's Association254 that FLPMA authorized the review only 
of areas greater than 5,000 acres. 255 The IBLA then considered 
whether the BLM could include as part of a WSA land that lacked 
the requisite wilderness characteristics but which buffered areas 
qualifying as wilderness. In Don COOpS,256 the Board held that the 
BLM improperly included these lands because all land in WSA units 
must have wilderness properties. 257 A substantial number of WSAs 
251 By contrast, the Forest Service found that nearly half of its 190 million acres technically 
qualified for wilderness designation. See California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982) (after 
the Forest Service designated millions of acres as wilderness, one third of the national forest 
lands still technically qualifies). 
252 Several decisions by the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) affirmed in part, but 
reversed or remanded in part BLM nonwilderness designations. See, e.g., Phillip Allen and 
Desert Wilderness Coalition, 77 IBLA 330 (Dec. 5, 1983); Sierra Club---Rocky Mountain 
Chapter, 75 IBLA 220 (Aug. 23, 1983); Utah Wilderness Ass'n, 72 IBLA 125 (Apr. 14, 1983); 
Timothy Kesinger, 72 IBLA 100 (Apr. 14, 1983). But cf. Michael Huddleston, 76 IBLA 116 
(Sept. 21, 1983) (affirming nonwilderness designation). 
253 The IBLA was created within the Office of the Secretary by Interior Secretarial Order 
on July 17, 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 12,081 (1970), in the belief that the Office of the Solicitor 
should not serve as both an agency advocate and an objective judge in disputes between 
Interior and others. See Richardson, Making Your Voice Heard at the Department of the 
Interior, 1 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 13 (1985). Although the Solicitor now serves as agency 
advocate, the IBLA is the Secretary's official representative in adjudicating specified disputes. 
The Secretary has authority to take jurisdiction of and overturn IBLA decisions. See 43 
C.F.R. § 4.5 (1988). 
254 60 IBLA 305 (Dec. 18, 1981). 
255Id. at 312. In interpreting § 603(a), the IBLA concluded: 
[O]nce the inventory stage is completed, the authority for designation of areas of the 
public lands as WSAs [Wilderness Study Areas] is derived from § 603(a) of FLPMA. 
That section directs the Secretary to review only those areas of 5,000 acres or more. 
Thus, it appears that § 603(a) of the FLPMA established a minimum acreage require-
ment for WSAs. 
Id. (emphasis in original). 
256 61 IBLA 300 (Feb. 3, 1982). 
257Id. at 307. 
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had fewer than 5,000 acres without the buffering lands. 258 In a third 
opinion, Santa Fe Pacific Railroad,259 the IBLA decided that the 
BLM could not designate WSAs on lands that possessed the neces-
sary wilderness qualities if they overlay privately owned mineral 
estates. In managing split-estate WSAs, the IBLA held, the BLM 
would be impermissibly encumbering vested mineral rights. 260 
Secretary Watt amended the BLM's wilderness inventory proce-
dures on December 30, 1982,261 removing more than 1.5 million acres 
formerly designated as WSAs from the protection of the BLM's 
Interim Management Policy (IMP).262 The IMP essentially required 
maintenance of the status quo pending disposition of a study area. 
The deleted WSA lands included 138,000 acres contiguous to wilder-
ness areas, 625,000 acres with split mineral-surface estates, and 158 
WSAs with fewer than 5,000 acres. 263 
Two years later, the court in Sierra Club v. Watt264 reversed most 
of the Secretary's decisions to delete lands. In holding that split 
estates could be WSAS,265 the court relied on the FLPMA's definition 
of "public lands," which includes "any land and interest in land owned 
by the United States. "266 Because the Secretary must study all the 
public lands for wilderness potential, and because the surface estates 
are interests in the public lands, the areas must be studied for 
wilderness characteristics. 267 
258 See Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 313 n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1985). 
259 64 IBLA 27, 33 (May 6, 1982). 
260 [d. at 34. The IBLA reasoned that the mineral estate, owned in fee simple, is a "vested 
right" while the surface wilderness estate is only a "valid existing right." [d. at 33. 
261 47 Fed. Reg. 58,372 (l982). 
262 Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 313 n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1985). The BLM's Interim 
Management Policy was first published under Secretary Andrus on December 12, 1979, to 
partially implement section 603(c) of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1982), which requires the 
Secretary to 
manage ... [potential wilderness areas] ... so as not to impair the suitability of 
such areas for preservation as wilderness, subject, however, to the continuation of 
existing mining and grazing uses and mineral leasing in the manner and degree in 
which the same was being conducted on October 21, 1976; provided, that in managing 
the public lands the Secretary shall by regulation or otherwise take any action 
required to prevent unnecessary or undue degradation of the lands and their re-
sources or to afford environmental protection. 
[d.; see also Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (lOth Cir. 1982). 
263 Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305, 312 n.9, 313 n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1985). 
264 [d. 
265 [d. at 335. 
266 43 U.S.C. § 1702(e) (1982). The court distinguished the contrary holding in Columbia 
Basin Land Protection Association v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585 (9th Cir. 1981), on the basis 
of the analysis in Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., 462 U.S. 36 (1983). Sierra Club, 608 F. 
Supp. at 337. 
267 608 F. Supp. at 333. 
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The court agreed with the IBLA that Secretary Andrus had no 
authority under the FLPMA to designate as WSAs areas of fewer 
than 5,000 acres, and that the portion of Secretary Watt's order 
deleting these lands was valid insofar as Secretary Andrus relied on 
that section. 268 The court also found, however, that Secretary Andrus 
did have authority under other sections of FLPMA to designate 
these areas for special protection.269 Secretary Watt's further action 
of returning the lands to unrestricted multiple use management was 
therefore without a legal basis because he neglected to determine 
the proper management standard. 270 U ntH the Department considers 
the other bases of Secretary Andrus' order and exercises its discre-
tion to fashion standards for management, the lands will remain in 
the protective status assigned them by Secretary Andrus. 271 
The result in Sierra Club v. Watt restored some degree of protec-
tion to ninety percent of the lands that Secretary Watt had with-
drawn from the wilderness study. The decision does not ensure 
eventual wilderness designation for any of these areas, however, it 
merely restores them to the inventory for further study. 
Future challenges to the BLM's study process will be much more 
difficult to mount. The process involves hundreds of individual de-
cisions on millions of acres over many years. 272 Areas may be effec-
tively deleted in a number of subtle ways, including changes in 
boundaries and reassessments of energy or timber resources. 273 De-
cisions on individual areas will not receive the same national publicity 
as Watt's December, 1982 order. Whether many isolated tracts are 
given the consideration on the merits commanded by the statute 
before being relegated to nonwilderness status will depend largely 
on the vigilance and resources of conservation groups, because the 
BLM has evidenced a consistent antiwilderness bias. Given the dem-
onstrated willingness of local and national environmental organiza-
tions to pursue legal remedies involving the Forest Service's parallel 
268 [d. at 340. 
269 [d. at 341-42. 
270 [d. at 340. In an interview, Watt said that now these WSAs can be released by admin-
istrative action rather than only by Congress. Shabecoff, Watt v. Wilderness-Over For Now, 
L.A. Daily J., Feb. 3, 1983, at 4, col. 3. 
271 608 F. Supp. at 341-42. 
272 See infra notes 435-42 and accompanying text. See generally Watson, Mineral and Oil 
and Gas Development in Wilderness Areas and Other Specially Managed Federal Lands in 
the United States, 29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 37, 55 & n.76 (1983) (evolution of the BLM's 
wilderness area study and management policies). 
273 The IBLA has already dealt with a number of BLM decisions on individual areas, and 
most of these involve boundary determinations, whether old roads in the area should prevent 
the area from qualifying as wilderness, or the proper criteria to determine solitude and the 
potential for recreation opportunities. See supra note 252 and cases cited therein. 
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wilderness study process,274 more suits are likely as the BLM wil-
derness study progresses. The Watt Administration should have 
learned from the wrenching Forest Service experience in the wil-
derness designation arena,275 but its ideological rigidity prompted 
precipitousness that compounded its problems. 
C. Transferring Jurisdiction 
Mr. Watt's arsenal of weapons in his war on preservation also 
included administrative transfers of jurisdiction, usually from an 
agency whose statutory mission tilted toward resource preservation 
to one more development-oriented. In one instance, transfer of man-
agement authority to a state was successful after legislative inter-
vention. The Secretary's attempted transfer of mineral study au-
thority away from the FWS was enjoined, however, and his broader, 
better-conceived transfer package between the BLM and the Forest 
Service bore relatively little fruit. The same theme recurs: because 
Mr. Watt proposed so many actions with apparent anticonservation 
purposes and inspired so much personal animosity, his worthwhile 
ideas as well as his indefensible ploys were rejected indiscriminately. 
1. The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge 
The huge oil strike at Prudhoe Bay in northern Alaska generated 
intense industry interest in the production potential of the nearby 
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), particularly its coastal 
plain. Resource development was frozen in Alaska during the 1970s 
pending congressional decision on which lands should be placed in 
which federal lands systems. 276 The logjam was broken by the Alaska 
National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (ANILCA).277 One 
ANILCA provision directed the Secretary to carry out a study for 
recommending mineral exploration guidelines in the ANWR. 278 On 
274 See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 448 F.2d 793 (10th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 
989 (1972). 
275 Courts several times forced the Forest Service to start the whole process almost over 
again when it failed to take the statutory spirit and commands sufficiently seriously. The 
setbacks, described in G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, ch. 11, § C, were capped 
by the decision in California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982). 
276 See Rudd, Who Owns Alaska?-Mineral Rights Acquisition Amid Rapidly Changing 
Land Ownership, 20 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 109 (1975). 
277 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233 (1988). 
278 [d. § 3142(c); S. REP. No. 413, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 126, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE 
CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5070, 5070-72. Section 3142 of ANILCA directs the Secretary of the 
Interior to conduct a baseline study of fish and wildlife in the refuge, and prepare guidelines 
for oil and gas exploration based on the baseline study results. 16 U.S.C. § 3142(c) (1988). 
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March 12, 1981, Secretary Watt transferred lead responsibility for 
preparation of the oil and gas exploration EIS and exploration reg-
ulations for the ANWR from the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) 
to the United States Geological Survey (USGA).279 Although an 
Interior agency would still retain primary responsibility, the move 
evidently was designed to ensure a more pro-development slant to 
the ultimate recommendations. 
A citizens' group named Trustees for Alaska sued, claiming that 
the transfer was invalid.280 The Department argued that develop-
ment of the oil and gas exploration guidelines was entirely within 
secretarial discretion. 281 The federal district court in Alaska held 
that the action was not committed to agency discretion and that the 
transfer was in excess of the Secretary's statutory authority.282 The 
court reasoned that the development of exploration guidelines con-
stituted refuge management,283 a function entrusted by statute ex-
clusively to the FWS.284 The court found support for its view in the 
legislative histories of both the National Wildlife Refuge System 
Administration Act (NWRSAA),285 which sought to eliminate earlier 
problems of joint jurisdiction and management over refuges,286 and 
ANILCA, which requires that development in the ANWR occur 
only with adequate information on the adverse effects to fish and 
wildlife. 287 
279 Under Watt's jurisdictional transfer, FWS would retain responsibility for the baseline 
study, but the USGS became the lead agency on development of the EIS and the oil and gas 
exploration regulations. Trustees for Alaska v. Watt, 524 F. Supp. 1303, 1307 (D. Alaska 
1981), aIi'd, 690 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1982). 
280 Trustees for Alaska v. Watt, 524 F. Supp. 1303. The plaintiffs, including environmental 
groups and Alaska natives, claimed violations of the NWRS Administration Act of 1966, 16 
U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (1988), and ANILCA. 
281 524 F. Supp. at 1307. 
282 [d. at 1310. 
283 [d. at 1309. The court determined that protection of wildlife and control over human 
access to the refuge constituted refuge management, and that approval of exploration in the 
refuge "manifestly involves controlling and directing human access to the refuge. This must 
be done by the FWS." [d. The court relied in part on the makeshift definition of wildlife 
management crafted in Coggins & Ward, supra note 31, at 68-69. 
284 524 F. Supp. at 1304-05. 
285 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1988). 
286 The court noted that Congress, in passing the NWRSAA, affirmed its intent that the 
FWS was to be the exclusive administering agency, "thereby eliminating the possibility of 
the Secretary delegating his authority to ... any other Interior agency." 524 F. Supp. at 
1309; see M. BEAN, supra note 31, at 128-29. 
287 16 U.S.C. § 3142 (1988); see 524 F. Supp. at 1310; cf. Schwenke v. Secretary of the 
Interior, 720 F.2d 571, 574-75 (9th Cir. Hl83) (wildlife allowed slightly limited priority over 
cattle on the Charles M. Russell Range). 
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The Watt years were not characterized by overly close adherence 
to statutory requirements, but the statutes in this instance were not 
explicit. The attempted transfer nevertheless demonstrates the peril 
of ignoring statutory purposes in pursuing ideological quests. Re-
viewing courts often focus more broadly than the Department, and 
they increasingly have been willing to demand compliance with the 
spirit as well as the letter of the law. 288 
2. The Matagorda Island Transfer 
One of Secretary Watt's few victories in his attempts to remove 
land from, or dilute, federal control was the 1982 transfer of 19,000 
federally-owned acres of the Aransas National Wildlife Refuge on 
Matagorda Island to management by the State of Texas. 289 Secretary 
Watt originally attempted to give the land to Texas, which had long 
sought the land for oceanfront park development, to administer as 
it saw fit for 100 years. 290 Although the Secretary is prohibited from 
disposing of lands that Congress included in the National Wildlife 
Refuge System (NWRS),291 Mr. Watt claimed transfer authority 
because the lands were originally brought into the System by a 
cooperative agreement between the FWS and the Air Force. 292 After 
protracted negotiations with the National Audubon Society under 
threat of litigation, a compromise was adopted whereby the Depart-
ment would terminate the original cooperative agreement, remove 
the land from the NWRS, and then transfer administration to 
Texas.293 The new agreement specified that federal oversight would 
continue and that the lands would be managed as a wildlife refuge, 
not as a park.294 
The Sierra Club, dissatisfied with the compromise, brought suit 
to declare the transfer void,295 alleging violations of the Refuge 
2B8 E.g., Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Hodel, 790 F.2d 760,764-65 (9th Cir. 1986); American 
Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962, 966 (9th Cir. 1983); National Audubon Soc'y v. 
Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825, 845 (D. Alaska 1984). 
289 Of the 50,500 acres comprising the island, 25,000 acres were already owned by the State 
of Texas and managed as a wildlife refuge. S. REP. No. 176, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), 
Appendix. 
200 N. REED & D. DRABELLE, supra note 31, at 31. 
291 16 U.S.C. § 668dd (1988). The National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act 
Amendments of 1976 allow the Secretary of the Interior to transfer refuge lands only if the 
Migratory Bird Conservation Commission certifies that the lands are no longer necessary and 
the government receives fair market value. Id. § 668dd(a)(2). 
292 See S. REP. No. 176, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), Appendix. 
293 N. REED & D. DRABELLE, supra note 31, at 31. 
294 Id. 
295 Sierra Club v. Watt, No. 82-3638 (D. D.C. filed Dec. 23, 1982). 
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Administration Act,296 the Migratory Bird Conservation Act,297 and 
NEP A.298 Before the suit was decided, Congress held hearings and 
then ratified the new agreement with Texas, rendering the pending 
litigation moot.299 The Senate, however, did not intend this ratifica-
tion to serve as precedent for handling other agreements involving 
refuge lands, stating that the law did not "resolve the general ques-
tion of whether, absent Congressional approval, the action of the 
Secretary in entering into an agreement such as this one would be 
in compliance with Federal law. "300 
In some cases, transfer of refuge management to a state, or in 
cooperative management with the state, might be desirable from all 
viewpoints. If the state has the resources and the willingness 
to manage the lands in a manner that advances federal purposes, 
then the federal agency involved might better devote its limited re-
sources to other tracts needing more attention. But Secretary 
Watt's initial approach to Matagorda Island-simply turning over 
management to a state for 100 years without adequate guaran-
tees of protection-smacked of an attempt to move land out of 
federal control without regard for the federal purpose of protec-
ting wildlife in refuges. The ensuing compromise and legislative 
ratification, however, removed the possibility of frustration of 
federal purpose. 
3. The BLM/Forest Service Land Exchange Proposal 
No good reason justifies the current separate existence of the BLM 
and the Forest Service. The two agencies began with many similar 
functions, and the parallels became even stronger after the enact-
ment of FLPMA in 1976. Both agencies now operate under multiple 
296 16 U.S.C. §§ 668dd-668ee (1988). The Sierra Club asserted that Watt violated section 
668dd(b)(3) of the Refuge Administration Act by failing to determine that the lands were 
"suitable for disposition." 
297 16 U.S.C. §§ 715-715(s) (1988). Section lO(a) of the Migratory Bird Conservation Act 
requires land reserved under that act to be administered by the Secretary of the Interior. I d. 
§ 715i. 
.29842 U.S.C. § 4321 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). Although an EIS on the cooperative agreement 
was prepared, the Sierra Club claimed that it violated NEPA because it failed to consider 
reasonable alternatives. The Sierra Club also claimed that the agreement violated the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988), in that the action was arbitrary and 
capricious. 
299 Hearings were held beginning in March, 1983. See S. REP. No. 176, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 4 (1983). The agreement was passed on August 4, 1983, and was signed into law as Pub. 
L. No. 98-66, 97 Stat. 368 (1983). 
300 S. REP. No. 176, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1983). 
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use, sustained yield statutory mandates,301 unlike the "dominant use" 
commands to the National Park Service302 and the Fish and Wildlife 
Service.303 The Forest Service, as its name implies, traditionally has 
been viewed as the nation's timber resources manager,304 while the 
BLM historically has been associated with grazing regulation. 305 But 
both agencies manage large tracts of grazing and timber lands; both 
have a say in hardrock mining-claim location and oil, gas, and coal 
leasing; both must cater to recreation demands; and both manage 
wilderness areas. 306 The interrelationship between the two agencies 
is geographical as well, because their lands are contiguous and even 
intermingled in many areas. 307 
Other presidents have backed, unavailingly, creation of a Depart-
ment of Natural Resources that would include the Forest Service as 
well as the Interior agencies. The Carter Administration entertained 
the notion of merging the Forest Service and the BLM, but backed 
off in the face of strong opposition within the agencies themselves. 308 
Secretary Watt tried to engineer a less ambitious change: an ex-
change of lands between the two agencies and boundary changes to 
improve management efficiency. Unlike Project Bold, the exchange 
received relatively little pUblicity during the planning phase. The 
plan, in November of 1981, was portrayed as minor boundary "tink-
ering."309 More than three years later, however, word of progress 
on the proposal escaped when the GAO reported that the agencies 
envisioned an exchange totaling thirty-five million acres-15.1 mil-
lion acres from the Forest Service to the BLM, and from 18.1 to 
19.4 million acres from the BLM to the Forest Service.310 One week 
later, the Administration requested legislation to carry out the plan, 
estimating that 700-1200 fewer personnel would be needed. 
In addition to the opposition from agency personnel who feared 
the loss of jobs, the grazing, timber, and mineral interests also voiced 
301 Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960, 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1988); FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 
§§ 1702(c), (h), 1732(a) (1982). 
302 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1988). 
303 I d. § 668dd. 
304 E.g., Huffman, supra note 61. 
305 See P. Foss, supra note 55; Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 17. 
306 See generally G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, at chs. 6-8. 
307 See PLLRC REPORT, supra note 111, at 58 (map showing public lands in southeastern 
Idaho). 
308 Massive Boundary Changes May Come From BLM and Forest Service, Pub. Land 
News, Nov. 12, 1981, at 10. 
309Id. BLM personnel merely hinted that more than 100,000 acres might be at stake. See 
id. 
310 GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROGRAM TO TRANSFER LAND BETWEEN THE BUREAU 
OF LAND MANAGEMENT AND THE FOREST SERVICE HAS STALLED 17 (1985). 
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disapproval, as did some western states and environmental 
groupS.311 Congress expressed its displeasure through the appropri-
ations process by voting to prohibit any exchange before October 1, 
1985.312 In the face of nearly universal antagonism, this exchange, 
like Project Bold, was shelved. Congress resurrected the idea in 
1988 by authorizing an exchange between the agencies limited to 
lands in Nevada. 313 If Secretary Watt had only proceeded openly, 
with full public participation, and perhaps more incrementally, the 
streamlining project as a whole might have stood a better chance of 
general acceptance. 
Secretary Watt's program of removing legal barriers to resource 
development by reclassification or jurisdictional transfer was a bust. 
Even in the Matagorda situation, intervention by conservationists 
and legislative oversight thwarted the original anti-wildlife thrust of 
the transfer. The Interior Department's precipitousness and lack of 
foresight in the withdrawal and classification revocations and the 
deletion of lands eligible for wilderness study status actually harmed 
those whom Mr. Watt wanted most to benefit. The miners, mineral 
lessees, and others who initiated claims in the interim between the 
action and its judicial rejection were left holding the bag. Perhaps 
there is symmetrical justice in the fact that those same interests 
contributed substantially to the delay and partial defeat of the public 
land administration streamlining proposal. In these senses, counter-
productivity was a hallmark of the Watt tenure. 
V. PRIVATIZING RESOURCES AND DEREGULATING PUBLIC LAND 
USERS 
There is this trouble about special providences-namely, there is so 
often a doubt as to which party was intended to be the beneficiary. 
Mark Twain, Pudd'nhead Wilson314 
Secretary Watt's largely unavailing attempts to reduce federal 
land ownership and to make more federal lands available for devel-
opment were almost incidental to his other major area of endeavor: 
the simultaneous "privatization" of public natural resources and the 
311 See Long Knives Appear on Massive Land Interchange, Most Waiting, Pub. Land News, 
Feb. 21, 1985, at 3. 
312 See H.R. 2577, House Appropriations Committee, May 21, 1985. 
313 See Landfill Reverter, Nevada Swap in Jumbo Public Land Bills, Pub. Land News, 
Sept. 29, 1988, at 4. 
314 M. TWAIN, PUDD'NHEAD WILSON 38 (n.d.). 
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concomitant "deregulation" of public land users. America's public 
lands contain enormous wealth-generating resources as well as un-
paralleled scenery and wildlife habitat. For reasons more of history 
than of logic, different legal regimes under different statutes have 
evolved to govern the disposition of each of the major federal re-
sources: water, minerals, timber, grass, wildlife, recreation, and 
preservation. 315 While the degree of secretarial discretion in allocat-
ing each of these resources varies widely, the Secretary of the In-
terior usually has far more latitude in resource disposition than in 
matters of land titles or jurisdiction.316 
Secretary Watt's efforts to "privatize" federal resources should 
have come as no surprise, but the speed and magnitude of his re-
source disposition program outstripped reasonable expectations. Al-
most immediately upon confirmation, Mr. Watt declared his intention 
to lease the entire outer continental shelf for oil and gas exploration' 
within five years,317 to resume coal leasing on a large scale,318 and to 
stop reducing livestock grazing in areas where it exceeded grazing 
capacity.319 During the rest of his tenure, Secretary Watt also pre-
sided over departmental programs to increase motorized recreation 
at the expense of more primitive recreation values,320 to virtually 
destroy the Office of Surface Mining and its regulatory programs ,321 
315 See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, from which this resource typology is 
borrowed. While some statutes, such as FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1982 & Supp. V 
1987) affect allocation of all resources, each resource (and each land system and each land 
management agency) is also governed by separate statutes. As Justice Powell noted, in the 
context of hardrock mining law: 
"[I)t is fair to say that, commencing in 1872, Congress has created an almost impe-
netrable maze of arguably relevant legislation in no less than a half-dozen statutes, 
augmented by the regulations of the Departments of the Executive. There is little 
cause for wonder that the language of these statutes and regulations has generated 
considerable confusion." 
California Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419, 1438 (1987) (Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
316 See, e.g., United States ex reI. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414 (1931) (mineral leasing); 
Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1979) (grazing management); Hi-Ridge Lumber 
Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 452 (9th Cir. 1971) (timber sales). 
317 See infra notes 344-67 and accompanying text. 
318 See infra notes 379-411 and accompanying text. 
319 See infra notes 481-505 and accompanying text. 
320 See Sierra Club v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1985); Sierra Club v. Clark, 756 F.2d 
686 (9th Cir. 1985). On earlier disputes over off-road vehicle use in the California Desert 
Conservation Area, created by 43 U.S.C. § 1781 (1982), see American Motorcyclist Association 
v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983); American Motorcyclist Association v. Watt, 543 F. 
Supp. 789 (C.D. Cal. 1982). Exec. Order No. 11,989, 3 C.F.R. 120 (1977); Exec. Order No. 
11,644; D. SHERIDAN, OFF-RoAD VEHICLES ON PUBLIC LAND (1979). 
321 The Office of Surface Mining (OSM, now OSMRE) was created in 1977 to implement the 
Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1982 & Supp. 
V 1987). By 1981, the OSM had resolved many of the complex issues of regulation and 
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to dilute protection for endangered and threatened wildlife species,322 
to abdicate federal responsibility for grazing regulation on the public 
lands,323 and to lease minerals in wilderness and wilderness study 
areas,324 among other like actions. 325 At the same time, Secretary 
Watt's budget requests were aimed at assisting development and 
deemphasizing conservation.326 The Watt Administration's resource 
privatization actions echoed the Secretary's land disposition philos-
ophy. 
Some of Mr. Watt's resource disposition and user deregulation 
initiatives were short-term successes. On the whole, however, Con-
federalism facing it after a series of lawsuits. See In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation 
Litig., 617 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Mr. Watt vowed to change the agency's orientation. 
Legislative Changes Are Not Needed For Surface Mining Act, Watt Testifies, 11 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 1952 (Feb. 13, 1981). He destroyed the OSM as an effective regulator for the decade 
. of the 1980s. The Department's rewritten regulations did not pass judicial muster, for the 
most part. In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litig., 22 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1557 (D.D.C. 1985); 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1724 (D.D.C. 1984); 21 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 
1193 (D.D.C. 1984). But Mr. Watt's reorganization of the Office, his budget slashes, and his 
appointment of inexperienced ideologues to run it left the OSM an impotent shell, a state 
from which it had not recovered in 1987. See generally Menzel, Redirecting the Implementation 
of a Law: The Reagan Administration and Coal Surface Mining Regulation, 43 PUB. ADMIN. 
REV. 411 (1983); Barry, The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 and the 
Office of Surface Mining: Moving Targets or Immovable Objects?, 27A ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. 
INST. 169 (1982). 
322 During Secretary Watt's tenure, the Department disproportionately reduced funding for 
wildlife protection and greatly slowed the rate at which species were added to the list of 
endangered and threatened species. See Bernstein, supra note 101, at 75. Reversing long-
standing policy, Mr. Watt also allowed the State of Minnesota to institute a sport hunting 
season on the threatened and previously endangered eastern timber wolf. The Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the sport hunting season violated the Endangered 
Species Act. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985). 
323 See infra notes 506-24 and accompanying text. 
324 See infra notes 412-42 and accompanying text. 
325 Secretary Watt also advocated opening federal lands, including national parks, to snow-
mobile use even as he was being picketed for asserted callousness toward natural amenities. 
Watt Asks Change on Trail Vehicles, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1981, at AI, col. 1. He favored 
diluting protection for BLM wilderness study areas. See Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n 
v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 746 n.17 (10th Cir. 1982). He also supported the idea of allowing strip 
mining in an area adjacent to a national park. See Federal Court Bans Surface Mining Outside 
Bryce Canyon in Utah, 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1511 (Jan. 7, 1983). For criticism of Mr. Watt's 
administration of the Department, see Culhane, supra note 98, at 296. When Mr. Watt cut 
short a Colorado River trip because he didn't like to walk and didn't like to paddle, conser-
vationists took his remarks as an indication of a general anticonservation attitude. See, e.g., 
Reed, GOP Conservationism, N.Y. Times, June 27,1981, at 23. 
326 Secretary Watt performed budgetary surgery that left permanent scars on the face of 
the Department's conservation programs. His budget requests, personnel reductions and 
transfers, and reorganizations had one common denominator: increasing resources for mineral 
and other production and decreasing resources for enforcement, habitat protection, and similar 
resource conservation programs. See Barry, supra note 321, at 216-17 (OSM funding), Pub. 
Land News, Aug. 6, 1981, at 3. 
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gress, courts, and the general public consigned the Watt program 
to an oblivion from which it will not soon emerge. No complete 
survey of every administrative venture under the heading of "pri-
vatization and deregulation" is possible in this space. This section 
therefore is limited to several prominent facets of the Department's 
mineral leasing and livestock grazing management programs. Even 
here, in areas where Interior Secretaries encounter relatively fewer 
legal restraints, the Watt Revolution largely fizzled, and some ap-
parent Administration victories were Pyrrhic. 
A. Mineral Leasing 
Hardrock minerals in the national forests and "public domain" 
lands can be acquired free of charge by any prospector who discovers 
them and locates a claim under the 1872 General Mining Law. 327 
Coal, however, has never been subject to location, and, starting in 
1920, Congress has removed fuel, chemical, and other types of min-
erals from the location system in favor of mineral leasing. 328 The 
1920 Mineral Leasing AcP29 was the model for later legislation gov-
erning outer continental shelf minerals,330 geothermal resources,331 
and acquired lands. 332 If a hardrock mineral prospector locates a 
valid claim, the Department may impose some controls on explora-
tion and extraction methods, but it cannot regulate so strictly as to 
deny or unduly restrict the established right.333 Mineral leasing of 
all kinds, however, is almost completely at the discretion of the 
Secretary until a prospecting permit or lease actually issues. 334 Even 
after lease issuance, the Department retains broad powers of control 
over lessee operations. 335 Mr. Watt determined to accelerate mineral 
327 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1982). See generally J. LESHY, supra note 17. 
328 See, e.g., G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 19, ch. 6, § B. 
329 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
330 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, as amended, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (1982 
& Supp. V 1987). 
331 Geothermal Steam Act of 1970, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1001-lO25 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
332 Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, 30 U.S.C. §§ 351...,359 (1982). 
333 See, e.g., Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 649 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981); United 
States v. Weiss, 642 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1981); South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190 (8th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 822 (1980). 
3.34 See United States ex rel. McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414 (1931); Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Andrus, 
488 F. Supp. 976 (D. Colo. 1980). But see Mountain States Legal Found. v. Hodel, 668 F. 
Supp. 1466 (D. Wyo. 1987); Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383 (D. 
Wyo. 1980). 
335 Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312,337 (1984); Sierra Club v. Peterson, 
522 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:473 
leasing, especially of oil and gas, in the face of powerful reasons to 
proceed more cautiously. This subsection traces several Watt Ad-
ministration mineral leasing misadventures. 
1. Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing 
Echoing the petroleum industry position, Secretary Watt declared 
at the outset of his tenure that national security demanded acceler-
ated offshore oil and gas leasing. 336 His announced plans, however, 
exceeded even the most optimistic industry hopes: he decided to 
lease the entire' billion-acre outer continental shelf within five 
years.337 Had that plan been carried out, all offshore fuel mineral 
resources would have been "privatized" in a short span of time. By 
contrast, the Department had leased only forty-two million acres in 
the preceding twenty-eight years338 under the 1953 Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA).339 State opposition, congressional ob-
duracy, judicial interference, and dry holes conspired to thwart Mr. 
Watt's grandiose leasing scheme. 
The OCSLA vests great latitude in the Secretary of the Interior 
to determine whether and how offshore oil and gas development 
should proceed. 340 Until 1969, the relatively low-level leasing pro-
gram seldom encountered serious legal obstacles, but the Santa 
Barbara blowout in January of that year changed the situation dras-
tically and permanently. Throughout the 1970s, environmentalists-
often joined by affected states-persistently challenged offshore oil 
and gas lease sales in court. 341 
717 F.2d 1409, 1414 (D. C. Cir. 1983); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 
609 F.2d 553, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
336 Watt OCS Plan Offers One Billion Acres; Environmental Groups, Others File Suit, 13 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 420-21 (July 30, 1982) [hereinafter Watt Plan]; see Note, The Seaweed 
Rebellion: Federal-State Conflicts Over Offshore Oil and Gas Development, 18 WILLAMETTE 
L. REV. 535, 538 (1982). 
3.37 Watt Plan, supra note 336, at 420. 
338 [d.; Jones, Understanding the Offshore Oil and Gas Controversy, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 221, 
225 n.12 (1982); see also Comment, The Seaweed Rebellion Revisited: Continuing Federal-
State Conflict in OCS Oil and Gas Leasing, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 83, 91 (1984). 
339 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1352 (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
340 See, e.g., California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
341 E.g., Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984); Village of False Pass 
v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984); Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983); 
Brown v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 
589 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 
1972); Massachusetts v. Watt, No. 83-1530 (D. Mass. filed Mar. 2, 1983); North Slope Borough 
v. Watt (D. Alaska filed Oct. 21, 1982); Kean v. Watt, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1921 (D. N.J. 
1982). 
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Their success in stopping individual sales was sporadic and largely 
ephemeral, but their efforts led to two significant developments. 
First, Congress in 1978 radically revised the leasing system, direct-
ing the Secretary to use innovative leasing techniques and to take 
more account of environmental factors.342 Second, the courts grad-
ually eroded the notion of the offshore oil and gas lease as a full-
fledged, protectable interest in real property.343 Mr. Watt's failure 
to apprehend the changes in the statute, in the state response to 
accelerated leasing, and in the judicial construction of lease terms, 
left his overall plan largely in tatters. 
a. The Five-Year, Billion-Acre Lease Plan 
Offshore oil and gas leasing is governed by a variety of statutes. 
The central leasing authority stems from the OCSLA as amended in 
1978. Congress designed the amendments to provide a comprehen-
sive framework for "expeditious and orderly development, subject 
to environmental safeguards, in a manner which is consistent with 
the maintenance of competition and other national needs. "344 Four 
stages of development are mandatory: (1) the Interior Department 
formulates a five-year leasing program;345 (2) the Department con-
ducts lease sales pursuant to the program;346 (3) the lessee engages 
in exploration activities;347 and (4) if oil or gas is found, the lessee 
develops the leasehold for production. 348 
The OCSLA as amended is not exclusive. Compliance with NEPA 
is a major factor in the leasing process. 349 Several offshore oil and 
gas cases have turned on interpretation of the 1973 Endangered 
Species Act,350 and, lately, on the 1980 Alaska National Interest 
342 Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92 Stat. 
629 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 1334 (1982)). See generally Jones, The Legal Frame-
work for Energy Development on the Outer Continental Shelf, 10 UCLA-ALASKA L. REV. 
143, 155-67 (1981). 
343 See infra notes 374-78 and accompanying text. 
344 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (1982). 
345 [d. § 1344(a). 
346 [d. § 1337 (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
347 [d. § 1340. 
348 [d. § 1351 (1982). 
349 See, e.g., Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984); Natural 
Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 829 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
350 See, e.g., Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir. 1984); Conservation 
Law Found. v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946, 947 (1st Cir. 1983); North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 
F.2d 589, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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Lands Conservation Act. 351 Of special interest is the Coastal Zone 
Management Act of 1972 (CZMA),352 as implemented by the coastal 
states. The CZMA generally provides, among other things, that if a 
coastal state develops an approved coastal zone management plan, 
federal activities that "directly affect" the coastal zone must be 
certified as consistent with the state plan. 353 Those statutes in com-
bination have complicated offshore leasing considerably. As Secre-
tary Watt entered office, for instance, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit enjoined the implementation of his pred-
ecessor's more modest five-year leasing plan. 354 
Secretary Watt sought to simplify the process. The final version 
of the ultimately ambitious Watt plan was announced on July 21, 
1982.355 Despite criticism of earlier drafts, the final plan was very 
similar to the original proposal. 356 The final plan emphasized provi-
sions to "streamline" lease procedures,357 with a single EIS covering 
millions of acres and new bidding procedures that contained few 
safeguards against poor market conditions and below-market lease 
sale receipts. 358 Ensuing litigation, claiming failure to comply with 
fair market value provisions and to provide adequate environmental 
safeguards, was unavailing. 359 Similarly, the Supreme Court in 1981 
held that bidding methodology remained largely within secretarial 
discretion. 360 
351 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101~233 (1988). See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 107 S. Ct. 
1396, 1397 (1987). 
352 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1464 (1988). 
353 Id. §§ 1454, 1456(c)(1). 
354 California v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290, 1325-26 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
355 See Watt Plan, supra note 336, at 420-21. 
356 Comment, supra note 338, at 99, 102. The initial proposal was published in April, 1981. 
46 Fed. Reg. 22,468 (1981). 
357 Interior Makes Final Regulations to Streamline OCS Leasing Program, 13 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 280 (June 25, 1982). The original proposal also emphasized "streamlining." See Inte-
rior's Streamlined OCS Schedule Calls for Tiering Environmental Studies, 11 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 2245, 2246 (Apr. 24, 1981). 
358 See COMM'N ON FISCAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY RESOURCES, FIS-
CAL ACCOUNTABILITY OF THE NATION'S ENERGY RESOURCES 13~8 (1982) (management 
problem in royalty collection); Davis, Wilen & Jergovic, Oil and Gas Royalty Recovery Policy 
on Federal Indian Lands, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 391 (1983); Editorial, A Federal Fire Sale, 
Wash. Post, May 12, 1982, at A22. Despite the passage of the Federal Oil and Gas Royalty 
Management Act of 1982, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1757 (1982 & Supp. v 1987), creation of the 
Mineral Management Service, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,368 (1982), both designed to improve the 
management and fiscal accountability of OCS revenues, underpayment of lease royalties 
continues and may be getting worse. See Shapiro, Sagebrush and Seaweed Robbery: State 
Revenue Losses from Onshore and Offshore Federal Lands, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 481, 489-91 & 
n.69 (1985). 
359 See California v. Watt, 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
360 See Watt v. Energy Action Educ. Found., 454 U.S. 151, 162 (1981). 
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Mr. Watt's privatization blueprint for offshore resources faced a 
wide spectrum of opposition, and even many oil companies regarded 
the idea as far too much, far too soon. 361 States objected to Mr. 
Watt's brand of new federalism when he insisted on leasing in areas 
that the affected states thought too risky, and litigation exploded. 362 
As in its other resource disposition programs, the Department some-
times attempted to circumvent procedural requisites, and a series 
of injunctions ensued. 363 
Congress also rebelled, declaring moratoria on certain lease sales 
and constricting or eliminating budget authority for others.364 In 
addition, market conditions and nature militated against accelerated 
leasing during much of this period. Oil prices dropped sharply. Sev-
eral leases yielded only dry holes and were abandoned. 365 Despite 
the streamlining, offshore oil leasing never approached Mr. Watt's 
billion-acre goal during the ensuing five years. The billion-acre leas-
ing program generated more acrimony, confusion, litigation, and 
futility than oil and gas. 
b. The Offshore Oil and Gas Lease as a Property Interest 
The minor premise of Mr. Watt's major program of resource di-
vestiture was the sanctity of private property. A lease from the 
government certainly qualified as private property in Mr. Watt's 
philosophical lexicon. Courts, however, had been eroding steadily 
the quantum of property rights held by offshore oil and gas lessees. 
In 1975, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that undue\ 
. delay in allowing a lessee to enjoy the benefits of production from aJ1 
leasehold would constitute an unconstitutional taking.366 By 1977, 
361 See Jones, supra note 338, at 225. 
362 See Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312 (1984); Village of False Pass v. 
Clark, 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984); Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983); 
Brown v. Watt, 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Massachusetts v. Watt, No. 8301530 (D. Mass. 
filed Mar. 2, 1983); Kean v. Watt, 18 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1921 (D. N.J. 1982); North Slope 
Borough v. Watt, No. A82-421 (D. Alaska filed Oct. 21, 1982). 
363 See, e.g., Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d at 951. 
364 Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 108, 98 Stat. 1837, 1853-55; Act of Nov. 4, 
1983, Pub. L. No. 98-146, §§ 107-109, 113, 97 Stat. 919, 934-37, 938; Act of Dec. 30, 1982, 
Pub. L. No. 97-394, §§ 107-108, 96 Stat. 1966, 1982. Moratoria were continued on most of 
these same areas at least through fiscal year 1986. Act of Dec. 19, 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-190, 
§ 107, 99 Stat. 1185, 1241-1243; see CONGo RESEARCH SERVICE, LEASING OF ENERGY RE-
SOURCES ON FEDERAL LANDS: ENERGY, WILDERNESS AND OTHER CONCERNS 8 (Issues Brief 
No. IB83058) (May 22, 1984). 
365 See, e.g., Massachusetts V. Watt, 716 F.2d at 951. 
366 Union Oil Corp. V. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 750 (9th Cir. 1975); see also Gulf Oil Corp. V. 
Morton, 493 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1973) (equity required extending oil company's lease by the 
number of days that Secretary suspended the lease). 
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however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed the ability 
of the Department to halt lease operations or change lease conditions 
after the lease issuance if circumstances encountered subsequently 
warranted new controls.367 The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit went a step further in 1980, holding that the leasing 
process was segmented and that environmental evaluation could 
occur at the later stages even if the lessee were precluded from 
developing the lease because of information _acquired after lease 
issuance. 368 When Mr. Watt assumed office, therefore, he was not 
writing on a clean slate. 
The new Secretary's desire to return resource decisionmaking to 
the states in practice was selective. While he frequently trumpeted 
the superior wisdom of states in resource allocation and regulation, 
he was seldom willing to listen to state voices counseling caution in 
resource development. One such state/federal dispute prominently 
featuring the CZMA landed in the Supreme Court with potentially 
devastating consequences for federal offshore oil and gas lessees. 369 
California, fearing another Santa Barbara disaster, objected to a 
lease sale planned for the nearby Santa Maria Basin. When political 
persuasion failed to convince the Secretary of the Interior to delete 
the areas in controversy, the State of California sued, claiming, inter 
alia, that the lease sale could not go forward until the State certified 
the sale's "consistency" with California's coastal zone management 
plan. 370 The lower courts agreed and enjoined the sale. 371 The Su-
preme Court reversed, the majority of five holding that the CZMA 
consistency provision was inapplicable to the initial offshore oil and 
gas lease sale because the sale by itself did not "directly affect" the 
state coastal zone. 372 The strong dissent argued that the federal 
government had bound itself to the state determination at all stages 
of the leasing process. 373 
367 County of Suffolk v. Secretary of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1390 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. 
denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978). 
368 North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 606 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
369 See Secretary of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 343 (1984). 
370 [d. at 317. The Coastal Zone Management Act provides that, for states with approved 
coastal management plans, all federal activities "directly affecting the coastal zone" must be 
"consistent with" the state plan. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(I) (1988). 
371 464 U.S. at 319. 
372 [d. at 339. 
373 [d. at 357-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Bills to reverse the holding have been introduced 
in Congress. E.g., H.R. 4589, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.; S. 2324, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. In the 99th 
Congress, bills were introduced in both houses again. H.R. 5, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); 
S. 55, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); see also 15 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1504 (Jan. 11, 1985). Both 
died in committee. 
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The price of confirming federal supremacy was destruction of the 
protectible property aspects of the offshore leasehold, a result ob-
viously abhorrent to Mr. Watt's privatization philosophy. The ma-
jority of the Court was well aware of the congressional desire to 
make leasing more environmentally responsible. Environmental con-
sistency realistically could not be considered at the lease sale stage 
due to a lack of relevant information, the Court noted, but it could 
be factored in at the exploration and productiQ]Lsiages. 374 In other 
words, California and the Department of the Interior were free to 
make new consistency determinations at later stages and to impose 
additional conditions to alleviate newly-discovered or more clearly 
defined problems. 375 To the natural objection that the reservation of 
such unbounded regulatory power would destroy the lessee's prop-
erty interest in the lease, the Court replied that(a lessee has no 
traditional property interest but rather only an exclusive right t0.1 
pursue further administrative permission to develop the leasehold. 371 
To make sure that this holding would not be misunderstood, the 
Court carefully repeated it several times. 377 
The demise of property rights in offshore oil and gas leases will 
haunt indefinitely the very entities Mr. Watt most wanted to benefit. 
The same principles have already been applied in other areas of 
mineral leasing. 378 An oil and gas lessee conceivably could lose its 
million- or billion-dollar investment in the lease and preliminary 
development if unforeseen environmental problems cannot be over-
come by regulatory means. Secretary Watt evidently did not under-
stand that the interests of resource developers and of the states do 
not always and necessarily coincide. In retrospect, considering the 
multitude of factors then known that militated against immediate 
divestiture of all offshore oil and gas resources, Mr. Watt's efforts 
in this arena must be characterized as ill-considered. 
2. Coal Leasing 
The United States owns several hundred billion tons of low-sul-
phur coal in the West, much of it located in the Northern Great 
374 464 U.S. at 339-41. 
375Id. at 340-41. The Court stated: "The first two stages are not subject to consistency 
review; instead, input from State Governors and local governments is solicited by the Secre-
tary of the Interior. The last two stages invite further input for Governors or local govern-
ments, but also require formal consistency review." Id. 
376 I d. at 338. 
377 See id. at 338-42. 
378 See Sierra Club v. Peterson, 717 F.2d 1409, 1415 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see also infra notes 
438-40 and accompanying text. 
528 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 17:473 
Plains. 379 Treated separately in law since 1864, coal became a leasable 
mineral in 1920.380 Coal leases before 1975 contained terms extremely 
favorable to lessees. 381 Acquisition, frequently by oil companies, of 
federal coal leases for speculation in the 1960S382 triggered first a 
1971 moratorium on further coal leasing, 383 and then the Coal Leasing 
Amendments Act of 1975.384 Congress enacted the latter Act in large 
part to require competitive bidding on all lease sales, to obtain better 
royalty return to the government, and to ensure greater diligence 
in lease development. 385 The Ford and Carter Administrations' at-
tempts to resume coal leasing were halted by further litigation. 386 
Except for holdover preference right leases, no federal coal was 
leased during the 1970s.387 The moratorium created widespread legal 
confusion but likely had little effect on the coal market because 
billions of tons of coal were already under federal lease and awaiting 
development. 388 
379 See 1979 OTA REPORT, supra note 224, at 298-301. It is estimated that there are up to 
1.73 trillion tons of coal in identified United States reserves. Id. at 300 (table A-2). About 55-
60% of the identified reserves in western states are located on federal land. Id. at 301. About 
37% of identified reserves are located in North Dakota and Montana. See id. 
380 Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C.A. §§ 181-287 (West 1986 & Supp. 1989). 
381 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 558-59 
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (environmental protection conditions absent); cf. FMC Wyoming Corp. v. 
Watt, 587 F. Supp. 1545, 1548 (D. Wyo. 1984) (12% royalty is a 1000% increase), rev'd, 812 
F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1041 (1988). 
382 A BLM study in 1970 found that, from 1945 to 1970, the number of acres of land under 
federal coal leases increased tenfold, but annual coal production from these lands decreased 
during the same period from 10 million tons to 7.4 million tons. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981, 984 (D.D.C. 1977) (citing DIVISION OF MINERALS, 
BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL COAL LEASES 
(Nov. 1970)). 
383 See Krueger v. Morton, 539 F.2d 235,237 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (challenging order by Secretary 
of Interior suspending issuance of prospecting permits); American Nuclear Corp. v. Andrus, 
434 F. Supp. 1035, 1035-36 (D. D.C. 1977) (asserting right to coal prospecting permit by way 
of prior application for permits); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hughes, 437 F. 
Supp. 981, 993 (D.D.C. 1977) (challenging implementation of coal leasing program prior to 
issuance of Environmental Impact Statement required under section 102 of NEPA). 
384 Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975 (FCLAA), 30 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1982). 
385 On some of the problems the FCLAA was designed to address, see Federal Coal Leasing, 
1975: Hearings on H.R. 3265 Before Subcomm. on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. 
on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1975); Hustace, The New Federal 
Coal Leasing System, 10 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 323 (1977) . 
. ~atural Resources Defense Council, Inc. V. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981, 993-94 (D.D.C. 
1977), settlement aff'd, 454 F. Supp. 148, 149 (D. D.C. 1978); see also Tarlock, supra note 139, 
at 332-33. 
387 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. V. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (Department of Interior stopped issuing permits for coal exploration in 1973). 
388 According to the plaintiffs in Hughes, 437 F. Supp. at 991, federal reserves already 
under lease would iast for over a century even at considerably higher production rates. 
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Secretary Watt's approach to coal leasing paralleled his program 
for accelerated offshore oil and gas leasing. He announced plans to 
resume coal leasing on a large scale and scheduled a series of major 
coal lease sales. His apparent goal was to privatize most remaining 
unleased federal coal without much regard for demand or safe-
guards. 389 The Department did manage to sell some coal during the 
Watt tenure, but by the time of Mr. Watt's resignation the coal 
leasing program was left in total shambles, a state in which it re-
mains. Little if any federal coal is likely to be sold at least until the 
1990s. At the same time, Secretary Watt essentially destroyed the 
Interior agency responsible for policing all coal stripmining opera-
tions. That damage too has not yet been repaired. 390 The Depart-
ment's brushes with coal blackened its reputation for credibility and 
competence, and those ravages with coal leases remain a prominent 
part of the Watt legacy. 391 
Two relatively small lease sales were completed in 1981. 392 The 
Powder River Basin fiasco came in 1982. Despite a soft ma~ket and 
pronounced lack of developer interest, in 1982 the Department sold 
leases for 1.6 billion tons of coal in the Powder River Basin of 
Wyoming and Montana, one of the largest coal lease sales in his-
tory.393 The Powder River Basin sales were marked by allegations 
389 Watt claimed that the accelerated sales were necessary to "reduce the vulnerability of 
America to blackmail, embargoes, or other national-security threats." Taylor, Interior's James 
Watt: Hero or Villain?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 6,1983, at 52. The sales were more 
likely part of the Secretary's desire to transfer "more control and discretion for development oJ 
of federally owned resources to private industry." COMM'N ON FAIR MARKET VALUE POLICY 
FOR FEDERAL COAL LEASING, FAIR MARKET VALUE POLICY FOR FEDERAL COAL LEASING' 
374 (1984) [hereinafter COAL COMM'N REPORT]. The Coal Commission was highly critical of 
Watt's pre-determined mindset to lease large amounts of coal regardless of the market. See 
infra note 411 and accompanying text. 
390 See supra note 321. 
391 This subsection sketches the main points of coal leasing under Secretary Watt without 
detailing the Byzantine political maneuvers in those years. 
392 The Department leased 573 million tons of coal in the Green River-Hams Fork region, 
and offered 555 million tons in the Uinta-Southwestern Utah region, though only 88 million 
tons were sold. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION IN THE 
FEDERAL COAL LEASING PROGRAM 67 (table 6) (1984) [hereinafter 1984 OTA REPORT]. 
393 COAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 389, at 374, 379. The Powder River area contains 
the richest coal beds in the United States. Seams, in places more than 100 feet thick, are 
estimated to contain about 142.5 billion tons, accounting for two-thirds of all western U.S. 
coal reserves. Powder River Basin Regional Coal Lease Sales: Was Fair Market Value 
Received? Hearing Before the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1983). Watt set a target leasing level of 2.5 billion tons at the sale. GENERAL ACCOUNT-
ING OFFICE, ANALYSIS OF THE POWDER RIVER BASIN FEDERAL COAL LEASE SALE: Eco-
NOMIC VALUATION IMPROVEMENTS AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES NEEDED 1 (1983) [herein-
after GAO POWDER RIVER REPORT]. 
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of corruption and fire sale prices;394 an investigating commission later 
estimated that the sale price was perhaps as much as $100 million 
below market value. 395 This sale was made possible by eleventh-hour 
regulation changes to lower the minimum acceptable bid. 
Two lawsuits challenged the legality of the lease sales. The plain-
tiffs in one suit secured an injunction in 1985 against the sale insofar 
as it affected tribal lands in Montana. The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit later affirmed and expanded upon the injunction. 396 
Also in 1985, the United States District Court for the District of 
Montana held that the sale did not contravene land use plan provi-
sions, and in August, 1987, the same court ruled that the leases 
covering nontribal lands did not violate the statutory fair market 
standard. 397 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed those hold-
ings in 1988 without much helpful explanation or analysis. 398 
The latter judicial decisions came too late to rescue federal coal 
leasing. Public and congressional reaction to the Powder River Basin 
sales in 1983 halted coal leasing and indirectly drove Mr. Watt from 
office. In response to widespread criticism, more western state an-
tagonism, and critical reports by legislative auditors,399 Congress 
394 The eleventh hour changes in the leasing procedures were especially controversial. In 
March, 1982, the government's estimate of fair market value for each tract (called minimum 
acceptable bids, or MABs) became known to some coal company officials. COAL COMM'N 
REPORT, supra note 389, at 376. MABs are proprietary information. See id. The Department 
learned of the leak but took no action to delay the Powder River Basin sale. Shortly thereafter, 
Interior changed the bidding program by, among other things, cutting the original MABs 
nearly in half. [d.; GAO POWDER RIVER REPORT, supra note 393, at 17 & n.3. The new 
MABs provided no incentive to initial competitive bidding because the coal companies could 
increase their offers if the tract attracted competitive bids. Only three of thirteen did, and 
sale receipts were only slightly more than the revised minimum bid numbers. COAL COMM'N 
REPORT, supra note 393, at 390, 391, 392 & table 2. 
395 GAO POWDER RIVER REPORT, supra note 393, at 25. Under the FCLAA, coal is to be 
leased for fair market value. 30 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1982). Only three of the thirteen tracts 
offered received more than one bid; two were not bid on at all. COAL COMM'N REPORT, supra 
note 389, at 377. The average price paid for the Powder River coal was 3.5¢ per ton. Barron, 
Watt, the Nation's Trustee, is Selling the Goods, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 21, 1983, at 4, col. 3. 
396 Northern Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 842 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1988). 
397 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 677 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Mont. 1985), afI'd, 871 F.2d 
849 (9th Cir. 1989). For an analysis of the reaction to the district Court decision, see Top 
Court Asked to Hear Coal Royalty; Watt Sale Appeal, 12 Pub. Land News, Nov. 26, 1987, 
at 2. 
398 871 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1989). In addition, litigation challenging Interior's general coal 
leasing regulation revisions of this period has been pending since 1982. Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Burford, No. 82-2763 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 28, 1982). 
399 SURVEY AND INVESTIGATIONS STAFF OF HOUSE COMM. ON ApPROPRIATIONS, 98TH 
CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT ON THE COAL LEASING PROGRAM OF THE DEPARTMENT OF 
INTERIOR (1983); GAO POWDER RIVER REPORT, supra note 393. The GAO found that Inte-
rior's last-minute changes were "untimely and ineffective." GAO POWDER RIVER REPORT, 
1990] JAMES WATT 531 
established a commission to examine whether fair market value was 
obtained in the coal lease sales. 40o Undeterred, Secretary Watt held 
two additional, but relatively minor, sales of Powder River area 
coal401 and a larger sale of coal leases in the Fort Union region of 
Montana and North Dakota. The Department held the latter sale in 
the face of a House committee order to withdraw the lands from 
sale-an order Mr. Watt defied. 402 The Fort Union sale was enjoined 
due to the Department's failure to observe its own regulations. 403 
Congress then prohibited the expenditure of any funds for the Fort 
Union sale, effectively revoking it. 404 In Mr. Watt's last days at 
Interior, Congress reinstituted the moratorium on coal lease sales 
until the new commission reported. 405 
The Linowes Commission report, released in early 1984, was sca-
thing in its criticism of departmental leasing procedures and re-
sults. 406 Hearings by legislative committees and investigations by 
the Office of Technology Assessment reached similar conclusions. 407 
Secretary Clark quickly acknowledged the problems and promised 
to return coal leasing to the drawing board. 408 Coal leasing has never 
supra note 393, at 13. The GAO also disagreed with Interior's lowering of minimum bids on 
maintenance tracts. It believed that these tracts should command an even higher price than 
previously estimated fair market value, because these leases essentially isolate the owner of 
the nearby existing mine from leasing competition. See id. at 69-7l. 
400 Act of Nov. 4, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-63, 97 Stat. 301 (1983). 
401 See COAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 389, at 378. The two new leases sold for a total 
of $23.7 million. I d. 
402 See id. at 5. Secretary Watt believed that he need not comply with the House Resolution 
because the House had previously used the same provision to try to prevent oil and gas 
leasing in wilderness areas, but a court challenge resulted in a ruling that only the Secretary 
could determine the duration of such a withdrawal. See infra notes 422--34 and accompanying 
text. In refusing to comply, Watt declared that a delay would signal unreliability in the 
government's coal leasing plans, COAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 389, at 5, implying that 
a withdrawal of any duration was unacceptable. 
403 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Clark, 571 F. Supp. 1145, 1151, 1156, 1158 CD.D.C. 1983). 
Because the regulations, 43 C.F.R. § 2310.5 (1985), had not been rescinded, the court held 
that the Secretary was bound to follow them, even if the statute on which they were based 
was unconstitutional. 
404 Act of Nov. 4, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-146 § 112, 97 Stat. 937 (1983). 
405 See Interior Inadequately Evaluated Tracts Leased Since 1981, Congressional Report 
Says, 15 Env't Rep. (RNA) 145, 146 (June 1, 1984). 
406 See COAL COMM'N REPORT, supra note 389, at 415-20. "[AJt the very least, the Interior 
Department made serious errors in judgment in its procedures for conducting the ... Powder 
River lease sale .... " Id. at 420. 
407 See 1984 OTA REPORT, supra note 392, at ix. The OTA noted that "[tJhe planning 
processes ... have become too unpredictable and unsystematic to ensure compliance with the 
environmental mandate." Id. 
408 See CongresslAdministrat'ion Coal Lease War Comes to a Head May 24, Pub. Land 
News, May 10, 1984, at 8. 
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re-emerged. Until the coal market recovers and coal producers dem-
onstrate the need to transfer new reserves to them, federal coal 
leasing may remain quiescent. 
Secretary Watt's intemperate actions and remarks brought re-
bukes from the White House on several occasions. 409 White House 
patience had been exhausted by the time Mr. Watt-by then a 
distinct political liability-described the Coal Commission as com-
posed of "a black, a woman, two Jews, and a cripple. "410 That remark 
signaled the end of the Watt tenure, although aspects of the Watt 
legal philosophy lingered on in the Department. 411 
Mr. Watt enjoyed less success in his program to privatize coal 
than in his offshore oil and gas leasing program. The reasons for the 
failures were similar. Economically, demand for the resource did not 
justify the projected leasing levels. Politically, the Secretary antag-
onized state officials, enraged members of Congress, and inspired 
widespread popular obloquy. Legally, the Department cut too many 
corners, thereby undermining its credibility and generating disrup-
tive lawsuits with a procession of injunctions. Practically, the biggest 
losers over the long haul could be the coal developers with a real 
need for new mines and a lack of access to existing leases. Haste 
and heedlessness again achieved counterproductive results. 
3. Mineral Leasing in Wilderness and Wilderness Study Areas 
Secretary Watt not only took an interest in accelerated fossil fuel 
leasing, but he also concerned himself with the places to be leased. 
More particularly, and in keeping with his desire to open more lands 
to development, Mr. Watt attempted to lease minerals in wilderness 
and wilderness study areas, a radical break from bipartisan policy 
since passage of the 1964 Wilderness Act.412 The results of this 
initiative were iterative: the attempt failed, leaving only legal prec-
409 The best-known instance was Mr. Watt's decision to ban the Beach Boys from the 
Washington, D.C. Fourth of July celebration as subversive influences. See G. COGGINS & C. 
WILKINSON, supra note 19, at 887-88. 
410 See Bernstein, supra note 101, at 74. 
411 In September, 1987, BLM Director Robert Burford, one of the few remaining Watt 
appointees, was still describing the Department's many setbacks in court as the result of a 
concerted attack on his multiple use philosophy by "environmental vigilantes." Address by 
BLM Director Robert Burford to New Mexico State Bar Ass'n, Santa Fe, N.M. (Sept. 25, 
1987). 
412 See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 394 (D. Wyo. 
1980) (concerted governmental refusal to process lease applications for wilderness study areas). 
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edents that will haunt the Department and boomerang against pro-
spective lessees indefinitely. 
a. Opening Designated Wilderness Areas 
The original Wilderness Act413 embodied several compromises be-
tween preservation and resource use. 414 The Act, later made appli-
cable to the BLM lands,415 provided that mineral location and leasing 
in wilderness areas were permissible under stringent controls, but 
only until 1984.416 After December 31, 1983, leasing still could occur 
in BLM wilderness study areas, but lessees are subject to a man-
agement standard so strict as to discourage exploration in all but 
the most promising areas. 417 
Until 1981, the Department refused to process lease applications 
for wilderness areas. 418 A federal district court in 1980, at the behest 
of the Mountain States Legal Foundation, found that this policy 
constituted a land withdrawal without observance of FLPMA pro-
cedures. 419 Despite the highly questionable basis for that holding, 420 
the Reagan Administration did not appeal it.421 
413 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1135 (1988). 
414Id. §§ 1133(d)(2)-(3) (minerals); 1133(d)(4) (grazing); 1133(d)(8) (hunting); 1133(d)(5) 
(BWCA); see McCloskey, The Wilderness Act of 1964: Its Background and Meaning, 45 OR. 
L. REV. 288 (1966); Watson, supra note 272, at 58-61 & nn.90-lOI. 
415 43 U. S. C. § 1782 (1982). 
416 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1988); see Toffenetti, Valid Mining Rights and Wilderness Areas, 
20 LAND & WATER L. REV. 31, 32 & n.2 (1985). The ban on mineral leasing did not become 
effective until December 31, 1983, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1988), thus leaving a 20-year 
"window" from 1963 until 1983 during which wilderness areas would legally be available for 
leasing. A few wilderness areas were designated with no development windows. E.g., 16 
U.S.C. §§ 460aa-1, -9 (1988) (Sawtooth National Recreation Area and Wilderness); 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 460gg-1, -8 (1988) (Hell's Canyon National Recreation Area and Wilderness). Other indi-
vidual areas were designated with shorter windows. E.g., Act of Oct. 21, 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-495, § 11, 92 Stat. 1649, 1655 (Boundary Waters Canoe Area Wilderness). Still others have 
longer development windows. E.g., Endangered American Wilderness Act of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-237, § 5, 92 Stat. 40, 46 (1978) (Gospel-Hump Wilderness); Central Idaho Wilderness 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-312, § 5(d), 94 Stat. 948, 949 (River of No Return Wilderness). 
Several writers have argued that mineral leasing of any kind is inconsistent with wilderness 
and permanently destroys the area's primitive characteristics. See, e.g., Edelson, The Man-
agement of Oil and Gas Leasing on Federal Wilderness Lands, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 905, 913-14 (1983). 
417 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1982); see also Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 
734, 750 (10th Cir. 1982). 
418 Mountain States Legal Found. v. Andrus, 499 F. Supp. 383, 397 (D. Wyo. 1980). 
419Id. 
420 See Getches, supra note 215, at 326 & n.267. 
421 Reagan administrative officials issued a directive ordering the dismissal of the appeal on 
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On the contrary, Mr. Watt instead announced plans to approve oil 
and gas leases in several designated wilderness areas.422 Members 
of Congress reacted angrily to this departure. The House Interior 
and Insular Affairs Committee purported to withdraw the affected 
areas from availability for leasing pursuant to the "emergency with-
drawal" section of FLPMA.423 The Department reluctantly acceded 
to the Committee's withdrawal order, but both the Pacific and the 
Mountain States Legal Foundations sought judicial invalidation of 
the congressional command. 424 The legislative branch and environ-
mental organizations intervened in the suit,425 making it a six- or 
seven-cornered donnybrook that some called "Watt v. Watt."426 
The case turned on the constitutionality of an odd form of the 
legislative veto, which is really more like a legislative action-forcing 
mechanism. 427 The district court's decision-rendered before the Su-
preme Court ruled in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. 
Chadha428-tiptoed a very fine line. The court held that the congres-
March 4, 1981. Id. at 328. In August, 1987, the United States District Court for the District 
of Wyoming again ruled that delay in processing lease applications amounted to an unlawful 
land withdrawal, relying in part on the earlier decision. Mountain States Legal Found. v. 
Hodel, 668 F. Supp. 1466, 1475 (D. Wyo. 1987). 
422 46 Fed. Reg. 27,734 (1981) (Washakie Wilderness, Wyoming); 46 Fed. Reg. 27,735 (1981) 
(Bob Marshall Wilderness, Great Bear Wilderness, Scapegoat Wilderness, and Mission Moun-
tains Wilderness, Montana); see also Watson, supra note 272, at 52 & n.61 (citing BLM 
Instruction Memorandum No. 83-355, Feb. 28, 1983). The decision to approve oil and gas 
leases in these wilderness areas was sparked by at least three different factors. First, the 
dramatic increases in oil and gas prices in the 1970s spurred interest in leasing on public 
lands. In 1972, oil cost $3.39 per barrel; in July, 1981, it cost $33.76 per barrel. Edsall, Boom 
and Bust: Economic Ills Strain Alliance of Oilmen, GOP, Wash. Post, Apr. 25, 1983, at I, 
col. 1. Second, the "window" on leasing was rapidly closing. See 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1988). 
The third and most important factor was the Reagan/Watt philosophy to open the public lands 
to private development. The Reagan Administration's aggressive onshore leasing plan was 
not limited to wilderness areas. In 1981, the amount of onshore acreage leased was 150% 
greater than in 1980, and the 1982 acreage leased was nearly double the 1981 acreage. See 
U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, A YEAR OF PROGRESS: PREPARING FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
1 (1982). Designated wilderness areas were not the only areas affected by Watt's push to 
make public lands available for private development-wilderness study areas, as well as 
candidates for wilderness, were also opened to leasing. See infra text accompanying notes 
435-43. 
423 43 U.S.C. § 1714(e) (1982). 
424 Pacific Legal Found. v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982 (D. Mont. 1981), modified, 539 F. Supp. 
1194 (D. Mont. 1982). 
425 Id. 
426 Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983). 
427 See Glicksman, Severability and the Realignment of the Balance of Power Over the 
Public Lands: The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 After the Legislative 
Veto Decisions, 36 HASTINGS L.J. I, 44-48 (1984). 
428 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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sional committee could order the Secretary to withdraw land, but 
that, to avoid constitutional problems, the timing, duration, and 
conditions of the withdrawal must remain within secretarial discre-
tion.429 This Solomonic rendering satisfied no one, but no appeal was 
decided because Congress mooted the controversy by forbidding any 
expenditures for processing the wilderness area leases. 43o Although 
the proviso expired three months before all leasing was outlawed by 
the Wilderness Act,431 Secretary Watt threw in the towel and agreed 
not to approve any wilderness leases during the "window" period. 432 
Litigation convinced other lessees of wilderness lands to exchange 
them for nonwilderness. 433 When 1984 arrived, little or no damage 
had been done to official wilderness areas by the Secretary's fer-
vor. 434 
b. Opening Wilderness Study Areas 
The FLPMA requires very strict controls on mineral operations 
commenced after 1976 in BLM wilderness study areas. 435 The Wil-
derness Act, however, does not prescribe similar safeguards for 
leasing in Forest Service wilderness study areas, where the Interior 
Department processes the leases in consultation with the Forest 
Service. 436 The agencies long regarded single leases as environmen-
tally insignificant and did not prepare environmental impact state-
ments (EISs) on them.437 In Sierra Club v. Peterson,438 the Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided that leases in 
429 529 F. Supp. at 1004. 
430 Act of Dec. 30, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-394, § 308, 96 Stat. 1966, 1996-97; Act of Oct. 2, 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-276, § 126, 96 Stat. 1186, 1196. 
431 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3) (1988). 
432 INSIDE ENERGY/WITH FEDERAL LANDS, Jan. 10, 1983, at 11. 
433 Edelson, supra note 416, at 917 n.86; Wilderness Area Leased Despite Agreement With 
Congress Not to Do So, 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 606 (Sept. 3, 1982). Watt said that he was 
"unaware" that the area was wilderness when he issued the leases. When Congress questioned 
him about the leases, he obtained "no surface occupancy" stipulations on them. 
434 Mining and mineral leasing rights established before 1984 can be developed, see Toffe-
netti, supra note 416, at 36, and a few recent additions to the Wilderness System have longer 
"windows." The number of existing mining claims is unknown, but most have been or probably 
will be abandoned. Id. at 31 n.1, 61-65. 
435 43 U.S.C. § 1782(c) (1982). See Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 
(10th Cir. 1982). 
436 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(2) (1988) (permitting prospecting and other activities to gain infor-
mation about mineral resources in national forest wilderness and requiring Department of 
Interior to survey land for mineral values and to make results public). 
437 Since lessees drill on only a small fraction of leases, and fewer leases actually produce, 
environmental evaluation at the lease stage was thought to be time-wasting and futile. 
438 717 F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
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wilderness study areas were major federal actions with significant 
environmental effects.439 The court ordered the leasing agencies to 
prepare EISs in this situation unless the agency retained full au-
thority to deny the lessee all exploration and development rights. 440 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals twice has endorsed this reading 
and has extended it to all federal lands,441 while the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has allowed oil and gas leasing to proceed without 
full EISs.442 As with offshore oil and gas leasing, the Department's 
compulsion to cut corners redounded to the detriment of lessees, 
whose oil and gas leases now more resemble exclusive procedural 
rights than vested property interests. 443 
c. Opening Florida Wilderness to Phosphate Leasing 
While Congress was debating legislation to designate a wilderness 
area in the Osceola National Forest in Florida, Secretary Watt an-
nounced his intention to issue four phosphate leases covering much 
of the proposed wilderness. 444 The Forest Service had for years 
denied applications for these leases, contending that restoration of 
the sensitive wetlands environment following mining would be tech-
nologically impossible. Suddenly, during late 1981, the Forest Ser-
vice changed its mind and decided that reclamation would be feasible, 
and Interior coincidentally decided to issue the leases immediately. 445 
Florida Senators and other state officials filed suits to enjoin the 
issuance of the leases. 446 Furthermore, Congress responded by 
adding a mining ban to the proposed wilderness legislation. 447 The 
mining ban inspired President Reagan to veto the Florida wilderness 
designation legislation, the first veto of a wilderness bill. 448 Under 
439 Id. at 1412. 
440 Id. at 1415. 
441 Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 
1340 (1989); Connor v. Burford, 836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1121 
(1989). 
442 Park County Resources Council v. United States Dep't of Agric., 817 F.2d 609 (lOth Cir. 
1987). 
443 See G. COGGINS, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 23.02[4][B] (1989). 
444 Chiles, NWF File Suit Against Interior, Agriculture Over Mining in Osceola Forest, 13 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 69 (May 21, 1982). 
445 Id. 
446 Id. 
447 House Suspends Rules, Passes Bill to Ban Phosphate Leases in Osceola, 14 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 245 (June 10, 1983) [hereinafter House Bans Phosphate Leases]. 
448 Reagan Veto of Florida Wilderness First Under 1964 Wilderness Protection Act, 13 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1621 (Jan. 21, 1983). 
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pressure from Congress and Florida officials, Mr. Watt then an-
nounced that he would not issue the phosphate leases after all be-
cause reclamation was not technologically feasible. 449 Congress again 
proceeded to pass the Florida wilderness bill, but without the mining 
ban, and this version was signed into law in 1983.450 
The prospective lessees sued to force issuance of the disputed 
preference right leases, claiming that they had satisfied all legal 
requisites. 451 In the course of his opinion rejecting that claim, Judge 
Parker noted that mineral development is not a primary purpose of 
national forest establishment, and that it can be incompatible with 
timber and water supply purposes. 452 If that admonition influences 
other courts, it could justify far more stringent regulation of mining 
operations in national forests than has traditionally been the case. 453 
Judge Parker's opinion also might affect the validity of hardrock 
mining claims at their inception. The standard for issuance of pref-
erence right leases under the Acquired Lands Leasing Act454 is 
whether the applicant has discovered "valuable deposits" of phos-
phate,455 a standard that the court opined was identical to the mean-
ing of the 1872 General Mining Law. 456 In holding that the plaintiff 
had not discovered valuable deposits because reclamation was ad-
ministratively deemed infeasible,457 the court apparently put in jeop-
ardy some hardrock mining claims that might otherwise meet the 
discovery test of United States v. Coleman. 458 If a finding of technical 
feasibility or infeasibility is to be treated as a political decision, 
industry can stake little comfort in science or in departmental state-
ments of intention. Like the decision in Secretary of the Interior v. 
Calij()mia,459 this Interior Department victory is potentially Pyrrhic 
from the viewpoint of Mr. Watt's privatization philosophy. 
449 House Bans Phosphate Leases, supra note 447, at 246. 
450 See Florida Wilderness Act of 1983, § 1, 98 Stat. 1665. 
451 Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Hodel, 630 F. Supp. 621 (D.D.C. 1986), vacated as moot, 840 F.2d 
68 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
452 I d. at 629. 
453 See Converse v. Udall, 399 F.2d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 1968). See generally J. LESHY, supra 
note 17, at 164-66. 
454 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-359 (1982). 
455Id. § 352. 
456 Kerr-McGee, 630 F. Supp. at 624-25; cf 30 U.S.C. § 211(b) (1982). See generally Fairfax 
& Andrews, Debate Within and Debate Without: NEPA and the Redefinition of the "Prudent 
Man" Rule, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 505 (1979). 
457 Kerr-McGee, 630 F. Supp. at 629. 
458 390 U.S. 599 (1968); see also J. LESHY, supra note 17, at 148-50. 
459 464 U.S. 312 (1984); see also supra notes 369-72 and accompanying text. 
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B. Livestock Grazing Management on the Public Lands 
The problems of the Watt Administration in managing subsurface 
mineral resources were mirrored by the difficulties it experienced in 
managing surface resources-which, for the BLM, is primarily live-
stock grazing management.460 Secretary Watt tried to reverse his-
toric trends in this arena, but he achieved only mixed results. In the 
short term, courts emphatically rejected his new program for abdi-
cating federal management responsibility, but, in the longer term, 
his initiatives may have set back by a decade or more the national 
priority of improving public rangeland conditions. This section begins 
with a synopsis of historical public range law developments and then 
recounts Mr. Watt's changes and their judicial reception. 
1. Short History of Livestock Grazing Regulation on the Public 
Lands 
Outside Alaska, the BLM administers roughly 170 million acres, 
nearly all of it devoted to livestock grazing.461 BLM land tends to be 
high, rocky, and arid or semi-arid, and most is unsuitable for con-
ventional agriculture. 462 A century ago, when these public lands were 
free from regulation, overgrazing severely eroded their grass-pro-
ducing capacity.463 Pursuant to the Taylor Grazing Act of 1934,464 
the government withdrew the unclaimed, unreserved federal lands 
into grazing districts to be managed by a federal agency. 465 
A half-century of BLM regulation under the Taylor Act has sta-
bilized but not appreciably improved range conditions.466 The BLM 
460 Although the Classification and Multiple Use Act of 1964,43 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1418 (expired 
1970), and the FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1982), called for rough equality of resource 
treatment in BLM surface management, the agency has continued to regard livestock use as 
the dominant use of the public lands to which all other uses (save minerals) and values are 
subservient. See generally Coggins, supra note 57. 
461 See Coggins & Lindeberg.Johnson, supra note 17, at 2. 
462 See, e.g., P. Foss, supra note 55, at 4; E. PEFFER, supra note 27, at 219. 
463 See, e.g., Box, The American Rangelands: Their Condition and Policy Implications for 
Management, in RANGELAND POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 16 (1979) (proceedings of a sym-
posium held Jan. 28-31, 1979, in Tucson, Ariz.); Coggins, Evans & Lindeberg.Johnson, The 
Law of Public Rangeland Management I: The Extent and Distribution of Federal Power, 12 
ENVTL. L. 535, 541 n.29 (1982); Cox, Deterioration of Southern Arizona's Grasslands: Effects 
of New Federal Grazing Legislation Concerning Public Grazing Lands, 20 ARIZ. L. REV. 
697 (1979). 
464 43 U.S.C. §§ 315-315r (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
465 See E. PEFFER, supra note 27, at 225-31. 
466 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 
1974), afI'd per curiam, 527 F.2d 1386 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 913 (1976). 
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was unable to effectuate reforms to improve range conditions be-
cause it has long been a weak agency, dominated by the ranchers it 
is supposed to regulate. 467 The Bureau initiated several improvement 
programs in the 1960s, but these efforts usually collapsed when the 
ranchers with heavily subsidized grazing permits opposed reductions 
in grazing levels.468 
Three related developments in the 1970s, however, promised fun-
damental change in public rangeland management. First, a court in 
1974 ordered the agency to prepare environmental impact state-
ments for all of its districts detailing the consequences of livestock 
grazing. 469 The EISs publicly revealed that range conditions were 
very poor and that improvement was unlikely until grazing levels 
were reduced to grazing capacity. 470 
Second, Congress in 1976 indicated its displeasure with range 
conditions471 and supplemented the Taylor Act by giving explicit 
authority to reduce grazing levels whenever the Secretary judged 
that conditions warranted it.472 The FLPMA also commanded the 
BLM to plan and manage for mUltiple use, not just grazing use,473 
and to observe sustained yield principles.474 Two years later, Con-
gress more emphatically decried poor and declining range condi-
tions,475 authorized funding for range improvement projects,476 and 
made range improvement a high management priority.477 The Carter 
Administration took tentative steps to implement mUltiple use, sus-
467 See Coggins, Evans & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 463, at 550-52. 
46B See Coggins & Lindeberg-Johnson, supra note 17, at 89-100. The federal grazing fee is 
only a small fraction of fair market value. The fee subsidy has been capitalized into the value 
of the permittee's base ranch, which accounts for the adamant resistance to reductions in 
permitted grazing levels, even though ranchers would be the prime beneficiaries of more 
productive grass ecosystems. See id. at 74-75. 
469 Morton, 388 F. Supp. at 831--33. The BLM agreed to comply with the decision. The 
agency procrastinated for several years, however, until the court refused to accept further 
postponements. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Andrus, 448 F. Supp. 802, 
804 (D. D.C. 1978). 
470 See Coggins, The Law of Public Rangeland Management III: Creeping Regulation at 
the Periphery, III, 1934-1982, 13 ENVTL. L. 295, 363-65 (1983). 
471 See 43 U.S.C. § 1751(a) (1982 & Supp. v 1987). 
472Id. § 1752(e). Grazing privileges may be adjusted at any time "to the extent the Secretary 
concerned deems necessary" if he "finds on reexamination that the condition of the range 
requires adjustment in the amount or other aspect of grazing use." Id. 
473 Id. § 1712. 
474Id. § 1732(a). The terms "multiple use" and "sustained yield" are defined in 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1702(c), (h). 
475 Public Rangelands Improvement Act of 1978,43 U.S.C. § 1901(a) (1982 & Supp. V 1987). 
476Id. § 1904. 
477 See id. § 1903(b). This section contains the strongest congressional statement of mana-
gerial priorities in all of the grazing statutes. 
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tained yield planning and management for range condition better-
ment.478 When those efforts included grazing reductions, the affected 
ranchers raised storms of protest that fueled the Sagebrush Rebel-
lion. 
As Secretary, James Watt evidently gave credence to the views 
of some permittee ranchers that they, not the government, were 
entitled to decide how to use the federal lands under grazing per-
mit.479 In addition to his plans for privatizing the BLM lands,480 Mr. 
Watt instituted a series of actions designed to privatize the public 
grass and to remove regulatory restraints on livestock grazing per-
mittees. 
2. Grazing Regulation in the Watt Administration 
The grazing regulation changes took a variety of forms. Under 
Mr. Watt's personal orders, the BLM imposed a moratorium on 
grazing reductions, introduced a "triage" system for evaluating graz-
ing allotments, and instituted a "cooperative management agree-
ment" (CMA) program. 481 While other reforms of similar purpose 
and effect went unchallenged, courts took differing approaches to 
lawsuits growing out of the grazing reduction moratorium and the 
CMA program. 
a. Planning and the Moratorium 
Environmental impact statements showing that more grass was 
allocated to permittee ranchers than was grown were primary 
sources of western unhappiness. Mr. Watt decided in 1981 that these 
EISs were all based on faulty science.482 From that premise, his 
Administration proceeded to abandon the resource inventorying pro-
cedures mandated by FLPMA483 in favor of trend data monitoring, 
to classify allotments by productivity (essentially giving up on those 
deemed in irremedially poor condition),484 and to hold livestock use 
478 See U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, MANAGING THE NATION'S PUBLIC LANDS 51-52 
(1980). 
479 Before assuming office as Secretary, Mr. Watt represented permittee ranchers as head 
of the Mountain States Legal Foundation. See Valdez v. Applegate, 616 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 
1980). 
480 See supra notes 143-62 and accompanying text. 
481 See infra notes 506-22 and accompanying text. 
482 See Dahl v. Clark; 600 F. Supp. 585, 586, 589 (D. Nev. 1984) (citing 1981 Directive from 
Secretary Watt). 
483 43 U.S.C. § 1711(a) (1982). 
484 The monitoring and classification systems are described in Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1050 (D. Nev. 1986), afl'd, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 
1987). 
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at current levels even where the EISs showed gross damage from 
overgrazing. 485 Those reforms led indirectly to a judicial decision 
that promises harmful consequences both for federal land use plan-
ning and for range productivity. 
For some purposes, the BLM has combined its NEPA obligations 
and planning duties into one process following its pre-FLPMA plan-
ning practice. 486 The second stage planning document becomes the 
proposal for action evaluated in the EIS and, as modified, then 
becomes the final land use plan. 487 The philosophical assumptions of 
the Watt appointees, as translated into the grazing reduction mor-
atorium and accompanying changes, greatly inhibit planning by elim-
inating many remedial options from consideration by planners. The 
stultifying effect of the limitations on the BLM planning process is 
starkly illustrated in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Hodel488 
(NRDC II). The Reno planning area, some 700,000 acres in Nevada, 
has a history of overgrazing and concededly poor conditions on 
roughly half of its land. 489 In promulgating a plan and EIS for the 
area, the moratorium on grazing level reductions precluded the BLM 
from implementing the obvious remedy. 
Consequently, the Reno plan was a nonplan: it postponed for five 
years consideration of grazing reductions, which it admitted were 
ultimately necessary; it indicated that the agency would rely instead 
on generally unspecified range improvement projects in the interim; 
it failed to specify any concrete actions or deadlines; and it lacked 
any significant substantive content. 490 The EIS mirrored the plan's 
vagueness. It too lacked factual detail and discussed only a very 
limited range of alternatives. 491 The plan thus was a substantively 
unreasonable delaying action, and the environmental evaluation of 
the do-nothing proposal steadfastly downplayed the overgrazing 
problem while ignoring possible solutions. 492 
In an earlier case involving wild horse populations, a federal dis-
trict judge in Nevada discerned the nakedly political motivation for 
485 See Dahl, 600 F. Supp. at 589-91. 
486 43 C.F.R. § 1600 (1988). Neither the court nor the agency explained why the FLPMA 
planning process was not being followed in the 1980s. 
487 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1049. 
488 I d. at 1045. 
489 I d. at 1048, 1053. 
490 Id. at 1052, 1054-56, lOb8. 
491Id. at 1052-55. In fact, the EIS even failed to mention the "no action" alternative, 
previously the sine qua non of the environmental evaluation process. Cf. Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981, 990-91 (D.D.C. 1977). 
492 The court was well aware of the main reason why the plan was a "nonplan." See infra 
note 501. 
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the moratorium and declared it arbitrary and capricious.493 In NRDC 
II, Judge Burns upheld the plan and the EIS, however, and the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed without analysis. 494 
The Burns opinion rested on three propositions: neither the FLPMA 
nor the 1978 Public Rangelands Improvement Act (PRIA)495 impose 
substantive standards against which BLM plans can be judged, and 
therefore, promulgation of a vague and facially counterproductive 
plan contravenes no law;496 a "rule of reason" allows the agency to 
evaluate a vague, nonspecific plan with vague environmental analy-
sis;497 and-perhaps foremost-the court should not be put in the 
position of "range master. "498 From these propositions and some nar-
row Ninth Circuit precedent on judicial review of land management 
agency actions , 499 Judge Burns opined that plan review was limited 
to whether the BLM action was clearly "irrational."500 The court 
took pains to point out that, while the plan made little if any man-
agement or ecological sense,50l policy choices are beyond the scope 
of review, irrespective of the motivation behind them. 502 
The trial and appellate courts in NRDC II can be criticized for 
failing to read and interpret the governing statutes. 503 The case 
493 Dahl v. Clark, 600 F. Supp. 585, 592 (D. Nev. 1984). 
494 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 819 F.2d 927 (9th Cir. 1987). After 
reciting the facts, the Ninth Circuit panel merely stated that "we agree with the district court 
that we cannot label this policy decision as either irrational, or contrary to law." I d. at 930. 
495 43 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1908 (1982). 
496 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. 1045, 1060 (D. Nev. 
1986). 
497 ld. 
4981d. at 1062-63. It is perhaps ironic that in one of the cases mentioned by the court, the 
Supreme Court upheld a district court judge who had assumed sweeping powers and duties 
as a state's "fishmaster." See Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing 
Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 659 (1979). 
499 Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803 (9th Cir. 1979); Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467 
(9th Cir. 1975). The court apparently distinguished the more liberal approach of later cases. 
E.g., California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1982); Foundation for N. Am. Wild Sheep v. 
United States Dep't of Agric., 681 F.2d 1172 (9th Cir. 1982). 
500 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 624 F. Supp. at 1062. 
501 In a footnote, the court observed: 
Why the agency would propose a course of action that can, with little effort, be 
seriously criticized as being more expensive, resulting in less long-run improvement, 
and even less grazing in the long run can only be the source of speculation to the 
outsider. Certainly one obvious explanation is that the BLM performed an adminis-
trative policy pirouette under the baton of Secretary Watt around 1981, essentially 
deciding to postpone grazing reductions indefinitely. 
I d. at 1056 n.6. 
502 I d. at 1062. 
503 Contrary to the courts' unexamined assumptions, the FLPMA multiple use, sustained 
yield management and planning sections do have some substantive content, however difficult 
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outcome seems to represent a dual abdication. The BLM abdicated 
its responsibility for improving range condition, and the courts ab-
dicated their review responsibilities. The possible consequences of 
the decision may be significant for public natural resources law. If 
courts continue to find that nonplans comply with the FLPMA, the 
congressional desire to systematize public land management through 
formal land use planning could be thwarted entirely.504 Unless some 
administrative, statutory, or judicial change occurs, BLM land use 
planning could be a dead letter, a paperwork holding action against 
confronting resource conflicts. Fortunately, other courts in other 
contexts have enforced FLPMA planning requirements in a more 
realistic fashion.505 NRDC II, however, still suggests that FLPMA 
purposes may be circumvented by plan provisions so general that 
they offer no guidance for actual management. Whether Mr. Watt 
desired this result is problematic. The unfettered administrative 
discretion in planning now apparently permissible is a two-edged 
sword that could work to the detriment of Mr. Watt's intended 
beneficiaries. 
b. Cooperative Management Agreements 
In 1983, the BLM proposed a series of amendments to its grazing 
regulations. 506 The most radical amendment established a new Co-
operative Management Agreement program.507 In reality, nothing 
was particularly "cooperative" about the idea. Instead, the BLM 
proposed near-total abdication of management responsibility to se-
lected permittee ranchers on their grazing allotments. Those chosen, 
by nearly nonexistent criteria,508 could graze their livestock when 
and how they pleased, without limitations, seasons, or conditions. 509 
The agency practically agreed in advance not to penalize them for 
to interpret and apply. See Coggins, supra note 57, at 65-74, 98-109. The courts' NEPA 
analysis is also at best shallow. 
504 See id. at 98-100, 107-09. 
505 National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987); American Motorcyclist 
Ass'n v. Watt, 714 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1983); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 
618 F. Supp. 848, 853 (E.D. Cal. 1985); American Motorcyclist Ass'n v. Watt, 543 F. Supp. 
789, 795-97 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
506 43 C.F.R. §§ 4100-4120.2-2 (1989). The proposed regulations initially appeared at 48 
Fed. Reg. 21,820 (1983). 
507 43 C.F.R. § 4120.1(a) (1984). 
508 Permittees were to be selected on the basis of whether they had demonstrated "exem-
plary rangeland management practices." [d. 
509 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848, 862-63 (E.D. Cal. 
1985). 
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even egregious abuses of this new, automatically renewable privi-
lege. 510 The several dozen such open-ended agreements entered into 
before the final regulations were published demonstrated the lack of 
criteria and conditions. 511 In addition to the CMA program, the new 
regulations also provided that the BLM, in effect: (1) would no longer 
dictate permitted grazing limits in allotment management plans;512 
(2) would allow local BLM managers to ignore land use plans in 
making grazing decisions;513 (3) would remove penalties for rancher 
violations of air, water, and wildlife laws on federallands;514 and (4) 
would no longer allow the general public to participate in or appeal 
from agency grazing decisions. 515 
Judge Ramirez, of the Eastern District of California, in Natural 
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel (NRDC 1),516 invalidated 
everyone of the challenged regulations. He did not speculate on the 
BLM's motives in seeking to avoid its conservation mission, and he 
assiduously avoided taking sides in the "cows vs. environment" de-
bate. 517 He nevertheless found the BLM regulations fatally flawed 
without reaching many of the plaintiff's substantive arguments. Pro-
cedurally, the BLM did not draft an EIS for the proposed changes,518 
and it did not describe accurately what the regulations were intended 
to and would accomplish. 519 
The court threw out the CMA program on the merits. It was not 
authorized by PRIA's experimental stewardship section,520 the court 
ruled, and it ran directly contrary to every federal law on the subject 
going back to the 1934 Taylor Act. 521 On this point, Judge Ramirez 
concluded: "It is for Congress and not [the BLM] to amend the 
grazing statutes. In the meantime, it is the public policy of the 
United States that the Secretary and the BLM, not the ranchers, 
shall retain final control and decisionmaking authority . . . on the 
510 See 43 C.F.R. § 4120.1(b), (c), (d) (1984). 
511 See 618 F. Supp. at 863. "These agreements list no terms or conditions whatsoever which 
prescribe the manner in or extent to which livestock grazing shall be managed on these 
allotments." Id. 
512 See 43 C.F.R. § 4120.2(a) (1984). 
513 See id. § 4130.6-3. 
514 See id. § 4140.1(b) (7). 
515 See id. § 4100.0-5. 
516 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 1985). 
517Id. at 881. 
518Id. at 871-73. 
519 I d. at 878. 
520 Id. at 866-68 (construing 43 U.S.C. § 1908 (1982)). 
521 Id. at 868-71. 
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public lands. "522 The government did not appeal, and it later paid 
attorneys' fees to the plaintiffs in recognition that its position was 
not substantially justified. 523 The official attempt to privatize federal 
forage thus failed, but, as NRDC II illustrates, the BLM grazing 
regulation scheme remains far from rigorous. 
BLM Director Burford (by 1987, one of the last remaining Watt 
appointees in the Department) later attempted to resurrect the CMA 
program in a package of regulation amendments that also would 
have abandoned the grazing capacity concept. 524 Public opposition 
forced him to abandon this latest manifestation of departed Secretary 
Watt's invisible hand. That seems a fitting postscript to the Watt 
Revolution. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
And indeed there will be time 
To wonder, 'Do I dare?' and, 'Do I dare?' 
Time to turn back and descend the stair, 
With a bald spot in the middle of my hair -
Do I dare 
Disturb the universe: 
In a minute there is time 
For decisions and revisions which a minute will reverse. 
T.S. Eliot, The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock525 
James G. Watt took office at a time when the Sagebrush Rebellion 
was still alive and resource economists were earnestly debating the 
merits of various privatization options. 526 The political mood had 
shifted far to the right, and President Reagan fully endorsed his 
appointee's radical proposals. 527 Less than three years later, Mr. 
Watt was dismissed in disgrace, his programs and his Department528 
522 I d. at 871. 
523 Conversation with attorneys for plaintiffs (July, 1987). 
524 52 Fed. Reg. 19,032 (1987). 
525 T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTE LAND AND OTHER POEMS 4-5 (1958). 
526 See, e.g., FORESTLANDS, supra note 212; G. LIBECAP, supra note 212; R. STROUP & J. 
BADEN, supra note 212. 
527 Vig & Kraft, Environmental Policies From the Seventies to the Eighties, in REAGAN'S 
NEW AGENDA, supra note 98, at 2. 
528 Mr. Watt left Department morale at an all-time low because he fired and transferred 
career employees, dismantled the Solicitor's Honors Program, hired on solely political bases, 
and imposed strict censorship. See Coggins, supra note 12, at 25 n.203. 
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in shambles. Blanket judicial rejection of his initiatives was on the 
horizon. By any scoresheet, Mr. Watt was a personal, professional, 
political, and philosophical loser. 
The reasons why Mr. Watt fell off the surging wave of conserva-
tism when many other facets of President Reagan's programs were 
being adopted bear reemphasizing. It is not enough to dismiss Sec-
retary Watt as an ideological zealot whose inflammatory rhetoric 
brought deserved political retribution. Other Reagan Administration 
officials of similar ilk, such as Attorney General Meese, survived in 
office far longer. Historians at some future time may produce a full 
exposition of public resource policy during the early 1980s, but at 
this brief remove we can only conclude with preliminary evaluations. 
The main reasons for the debacle, aside from Mr. Watt's provoc-
ative utterances, were the more precise substantive and procedural 
limitations of modern public land law; Mr. Watt's underestimation of 
public support for environmental protection, of the strength of op-
posing conservation groups, and of the inertial forces opposing 
change; his failure to obtain congressional ratification or state co-
operation; and his nonrecognition of the degree to which these trends 
effectively had circumscribed secretarial authority. 
The past quarter-century has seen public land law and policy 
change greatly, but the changes were more evolutionary than rev-
olutionary, and they continued long-established trends. 529 Mr. Watt's 
experience demonstrates that radical reform in this area is difficult, 
if not impossible, to accomplish administratively. Not only do recent 
statutes restrict secretarial discretion, but the interests of the De-
partment's political constituencies from all over the spectrum also 
have become so entrenched that even moderate reform proposals 
must overcome a form of political gridlock. 530 During Mr. Watt's 
tenure, many public land users favored his ideas generally, but even 
his strongest supporters resisted any proposal that might adversely 
affect their positions in any way.531 Other initial supporters were 
appalled at Mr. Watt's personal and policy extremism, and the west-
ern state governments quickly became disenchanted when the De-
partment did not consult and cooperate with them to the extent that 
they desired. 
Congress seldom legislates in the public land arena unless it per-
ceives an emergency or the contending parties reach general agree-
529 See id. at 3-10. 
530 See Leshy, supra note 4, at 272. 
531 See supra notes 140-42, 208-11, 311, 364 and accompanying text. 
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ment on the need for new, legislatively-set management priorities. 532 
With Mr. Watt in the saddle, however, even individual mineral leases 
became emergencies to which Congress strongly reacted. 533 The con-
servation/preservation interests were of course adamantly against 
nearly every change proposed by Mr. Watt, and they translated 
their opposition into effective legal and political action. Because Mr. 
Watt's attempt to impose his philosophy on the legal structure of 
federal land and resource allocation was essentially political, his 
failure was entirely fitting. Congress, not the Interior Secretary, 
has the constitutional power and duty to make such political deter-
minations, and it is to Congress that Mr. Watt should have turned 
for reform authority. 
The inconsistencies and unrealism of Mr. Watt's programs also 
contributed heavily to their rejection. Certainly he tried to do too 
much too soon. If the overall Department strategy contemplated 
overwhelming its opponents by sheer mass, then the strategy was 
defective. Instead, it led to broader and more concerted opposition 
in every forum. Economically, many of the Watt proposals were ill-
timed. Massive coal leasing, for instance, makes little sense from 
any governmental perspective in the absence of strong demand. 534 
Politically, ideas such as leasing in wilderness areas were bound to 
cause far more trouble than any possible production would have been 
worth. Practically, land and resource privatization controversies 
kept the Department continually on the defensive and embarrassed 
the only constituencies likely to support broad developmental initia-
tives. 
Mr. Watt could never reconcile conflicting strains in his ideology. 
Western public land users are heavily subsidized in a variety of 
ways.535 Mr. Watt could not both continue those preferences and 
532 An example is the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 
(1988). It took a lawsuit, West Virginia Division of Izaak Walton League of America, Inc. v. 
Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th Cir. 1975), which shut down many Forest Service operations, to 
prompt Congress into action, and Congress then acted only after the combatants had agreed 
on some general outlines of the necessary legislation. 
533 See supra notes 444-59 and accompanying text. 
534 See supra notes 392-411 and accompanying text. 
535 Federal water is delivered and federal grass is allocated by permit for a fraction of 
market value, preference right lessees pay no bonus, mineral locators pay nothing, and 
recreationalists usually enter federal lands without leave or payment, for example. Further, 
states receive a large share of the relatively small federal revenues from these activities. See 
S. FAIRFAX & C. YALE, THE FINANCIAL INTEREST OF WESTERN STATES IN NON-TAX 
REVENUES FROM THE FEDERAL PUBLIC LANDS (1985). The federal government also subsi-
dizes the West in less direct ways, such as predator control. See Coggins & Evans, Predators' 
Rights and American Wildlife Law, 24 ARIZ. L. REV. 821 (1982). 
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introduce free market, fair market value economics. Similarly, the 
Secretary's federalism principles were doomed when he honored the 
primacy of state resource allocation desires only insofar as states 
wanted unrestricted resource development within their borders. 
The names of cases cited in this Articl~ suggest another reason 
for the demise of Mr. Watt's reactionary reforms. The Sierra Club, 
the Natural Resources Defense Council, the National Wildlife Fed-
eration, and the National Audubon Society figure prominently as 
plaintiffs that successfully challenged Interior policy initiatives. Mr. 
Watt seriously underestimated the strength, tenacity, sophistication, 
and popular support of these and other self-appointed public interest 
guardians. To compound the consequences of that underestimation, 
Mr. Watt's confrontational rhetoric spurred the conservation orga-
nizations to greater efforts and filled their ranks with eager volun-
teers and donors.536 These groups thought of their efforts as holding 
actions to contain environmental damage until another Administra-
tion entered office. In fact, the legislative and judicial defeats they 
inflicted on Mr. Watt solidified the legal constraints on resource 
development that they advocated far more than would have occurred 
under a less ideological Secretary. 
The Watt experience illustrates another important lesson: the con-
servationists have won the battle for the hearts and minds of Amer-
icans. Because conservation and preservation values are firmly en-
trenched in the American consciousness, legal questions now usually 
revolve around means, and the ends are seldom disputed. Congress 
reflected that preference: not a single major piece of environmental 
legislation was repealed or seriously diluted during 1981-1983, and 
several new laws and amendments in that period strengthened legal 
protection of environmental amenities. 537 Mr. Watt was wrong-
politically, legally, and popularly-in claiming that the pendulum of 
environmental protection had swung too far. His futile experience 
(as well as that of Anne Gorsuch at the Environmental Protection 
Agency538) demonstrated that the environmental ethic is as firmly 
536 The Sierra Club, for instance, doubled its membership and its budget during Mr. Watt's 
tenure. See Gendlin, Mike McCloskey: Taking Stock, Looking Forward, SIERRA, Jan.lFeb. 
1983, at 45; Mitchell, Public Opinion and Environmental Politics in the 1970s and 1980s, in 
REAGAN'S NEW AGENDA, supra note 98, at 61-62. 
537 E.g., The Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, 96 Stat. 
1420 (Oct. 13, 1982) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988»; see also Coggins 
& Harris, The Greening of American Law?: The Recent Evolution of Federal Law for Pre-
serving Floral Diversity, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 247 (1987). 
538 In at least one notable instance, the EPA scandals had a decided effect on an Interior 
Department public resource allocation controversy. See Conservation Law Found. v. Watt, 
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fixed high on the national political priority list as it is embedded in 
positive law. 
In the end, that law proved to be the main agent of Mr. Watt's 
undoing. He consistently disregarded th'J process that Congress 
commanded as due, and his attempted circumvention of statutory 
strictures verged on the contemptuous. Procedurally, the Depart-
ment often had been inept long before Mr. Watt's secretaryship,539 
but the failure to observe statutorily required procedures during his 
tenure plumbed new depths. NEPA, by 1981, was neither unknown 
nor novel, but the Department often tried to ignore or circumvent 
the environmental evaluation it required. 540 As the "un withdrawal" 
case demonstrated, Mr. Watt also neglected to read FLPMA or abide 
by its procedural requirements. 541 A common thread in these in-
stances was the apparent desire to exclude all but the economic 
resource users from the decisionmaking process. 542 At least since 
Watergate, administrative secrecy can be a prescription for disaster. 
Procedural corner-cutting proved counterproductive, because courts 
seized upon the procedural deficiencies to justify injunctions against 
the developments that corner-cutting was intended to facilitate. 543 
Many of those disputed development proposals were then aban-
doned-perhaps permanently. 544 
Substantively, the Watt initiatives generated congres-
sional and judicial rejections of unprecedented sweep and 
magnitude. Wholesale land privatization was simply a bad 
idea, incapable of realizing much popular support. Courts in 
the St. Matthew's Island land exchange, 545 BLM grazing 
560 F. Supp. 561, 580 (D. Mass.), afi'd sub nom Massachusetts v. Watt, 716 F.2d 946 (1st 
Cir. 1983). 
&19 See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hughes, 437 F. Supp. 981 (D.D.C. 
1977); National Wildlife Fed'n v. Morton, 393 F. Supp. 1286 (D.D.C. 1975); Natural Resources 
Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829 (D. D.C. 1974). 
540 See supra notes 181-95, 264-71, 349-54 and accompanying text. 
541 See National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 230-44. 
542 That thread was evident in the "un withdrawal" case, the grazing regulations case, supra 
notes 481-524, the St. Matthew's Island exchange case, supra notes 181-99, and the privati-
zation program, supra notes 143-62. 
543 See cases cited supra notes 181-95, 251, 268-75, 332--37, 480. 
544 E.g., the Fort Union coal sale, supra notes 402-03; the St. Matthew's Island land 
exchange, supra notes 181-98; oil and gas leases in wilderness areas, supra notes 414--33; 
land privatization, supra notes 143-62; the Osceola National Forest phosphate lease, supra 
notes 451-58; wolf hunting, supra note 322; and the cooperative management program, supra 
notes 506-24. 
545 National Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 606 F. Supp. 825 (D. Alaska 1984), discussed at supra 
notes 184-92. 
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regulation,546 wilderness study area deletion,547 and jurisdictional 
transfer548 cases were not the only courts to decide that Secretary 
Watt's judgments contravened the substantive statutes. 549 
Strangely enough, it is possible to surmise that the legacy of 
Secretary Watt ultimately might be positive. Federal land and nat-
ural resources law, even after the reforms since 1960, remains a 
nearly impenetrable maze of statutes, regulations, doctrines, com-
mon law, and historical assumptions, which in its totality still lacks 
logic, consistency, equality, and fairness. Mr. Watt's pendulum 
swinging helps bring those defects into stark relief. Future Con-
gresses may and should use the Watt misadventures as points of 
departure for streamlining and rationalizing the law governing the 
Nation's landed heritage. At the very least, future Interior Secre-
taries may profitably learn from the events of the Watt years that 
administrative reform must be moderate, cautious, and popularly 
accepted. 
546 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Hodel, 618 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Cal. 1985); 
see also supra notes 516-23 and accompanying text. 
547 Sierra Club v. Watt, 608 F. Supp. 305 (E.D. Cal. 1985); see also supra notes 264-71 and 
accompanying text. 
548 Trustees for Alaska v. Watt, 690 F.2d 1279 (9th Cir. 1982); see also supra notes 280-87 
and accompanying text. 
549 Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985); cases cited supra notes 229-40, 321, 
322. 
